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I am delighted to forward Florian Sprenger’s extraordinary packet 
with this header attached. As Sprenger’s piece argues there is no 
communication without interruption, which I do so here at his 
request. I forward this packet—with its time­to­live decremented 
by one—but not without having done some “deep packet 
inspection” first. I urge the reader to do the same, and to send it 
on to the next node.
Sprenger’s piece is both political and media theory. If you think 
there is nothing left to say about Paul Baran’s famous 1964 work 
on distributed networks, then Sprenger’s reading may surprise 
you. Indeed, it is only in the wake of Snowden’s recent NSA leaks 
and a decade of fighting for net neutrality that the interrupted 
message of Baran’s invention is finally getting through, and it 
doesn’t say what most people assume that it does.
What Sprenger highlights—possibly for the first time since 
Baran—is the importance of the “micro­decisions” which route 
our communications to and from each other in the networks 
we rely on every day. These decisions necessarily interrupt 
communication, though at a speed imperceptible to humans, 
allowing us to tweet and chat and stream and torrent, whether 
contentedly ignorant or anxiously suspicious of every word. 
Indeed, in any given instance of communication today there are 
a mind­boggling number of decisions made at every node in our 
networks, routing petabytes of data here and there, according 
to tests and rules and codes whose conception, legislation and 
implementation are complex, intricate, and sometimes lost to 
history.
12 Sprenger highlights Baran’s invention of a communication system 
that “flows in bursts”—a coherence in contradiction that ena­
bles both the experience of a real­time communication net­
work and the reality of its constant interruption and execution. 
Baran’s article dwells on the necessity of processing messages 
at each node—a possibility only imaginable in the era of digital 
computers that can spend their time—like over­caffeinated postal 
workers—comparing and sorting information about messages 
and the state of the network all day and night.
I process this packet here at UCLA—down the street from 
where Baran penned his article at RAND. UCLA likes to bill itself, 
without any reasonable justification, as “the birthplace of the 
internet.” It is actually “the site of the initiation of the first host­
host connection made over the first general­purpose packet 
switching network, except for the one conducted by BBN staff 
with teletypes hooked directly to their minicomputers in order 
to demonstrate the algorithm”1—but that’s not much of a T­shirt. 
What UCLA can boast is the first Interface Message Processor, 
or IMP. The IMP is precisely the “micro­decision­maker” at the 
heart of Sprenger’s story; they were minicomputers whose sole 
function in 1969 was to collect information about the state of the 
network, make decisions about what to do with a packet, rewrite 
the header and send it on to the next IMP or Host connected to 
an IMP. IMPs have long since disappeared—as processing power 
and memory function increased, the functionality of the IMP was 
moved inside the operating systems of mini­computers and main­
frames and servers, making the standardized set of protocols 
called “the TCP/IP stack” a ubiquitous feature of now billions of 
devices. Now we carry our decision­makers with us everywhere, 
though they are not exactly “in our pocket,” so to speak.
1 I am indebted to Bradley Fidler of the Kleinrock Center for Internet History for 
this precision on UCLA’s role, which is otherwise quite significant, even if it 
isn’t the “birthplace.”
13One might ask, though, whether there is more than one kind of 
decision making at stake here? Are these in fact the decisions of a 
democracy—a rule of law? The “micro­decisions” of our IMPS are 
not the singular decisions of the sovereign—à la Carl Schmitt—
they create “exceptions” only locally, and if they do, it is precisely 
the goal of the design to route the packets elsewhere, to update 
the network, and to delegate power to other micro­decision­
makers. Which is to say, it is very much a radicalization of the 
idea of the rule of law; perhaps the most elaborate and extensive 
system for the rule of law yet imagined. Lawrence Lessig’s famous 
chestnut that “code is law” would seem to be a starting point for 
Sprenger, and yet even that provocative equation leaves open 
many questions. For such a “rule of law” involves at least two 
aspects of decision­making—the legislative and the administrative.
The micro­decisions of IMPs are most likely to be admin-
istrative—not the decisive creation of laws, but their execution. 
Taken together, all these micro­decisions make up a blindingly 
fast, hyper­efficient, automated, neutral bureaucracy. But it is a 
utopian bureaucracy: a dream of a bureaucracy without corruption. 
Such decision­making is easily and everywhere perverted—so 
much so that it is a nearly full­employment act for cyber­security 
researchers around the globe.
The legislative decision­making of the Internet is of another 
kind. It is not the decision­making of machines, but the design 
decisions of those who conceive, implement, code, update and 
maintain them. In a democracy, the setting of rules is a procedural 
solution to the problem of politics—one that keeps us, in the best 
case, from killing each other over our differences. The arbitrary 
powers of another, or the fanatical differences in the Hobbesian 
state of nature are supposed to be yoked to the process of 
deliberation, debate and decision. And yet for the Internet, 
decisions are arbitrary in the precise sense that no democratic 
procedure gave rise to them. These legislative “micro­decisions” 
of the engineers, software architects, protocol designers, the 
builders and maintainers of the networks and software and 
14 backbones and interfaces are largely undemocratic—espe­
cially when undertaken by large, opaque global corporations 
from Nokia and Motorola to Google and Apple to Cisco, Level3, 
T­Mobile or Sprint—who are, to differing extents, required to 
execute the wishes of the global security and cyberwarfare elites 
in government.
Which is also to say, it is a democracy of epistemè not doxa; not 
a clash of opinions played out in an election or a public sphere, 
but the reign of the philosopher­kings of the Internet: engineers, 
designers, corporate managers, academics, military strategists. 
Strangely and once upon a time, the Internet was explicitly con­
ceived in opposition to such a republic. The real radicalism of the 
Internet was not its technical structure (packet­switching, end­
to­end, TCP/IP etc), but the open system of revisable engineering 
standards enshrined in the Internet Engineering Task Force—an 
organization with increasingly little power over the very global 
network it ushered into existence. The storied IETF system of 
issuing Requests for Comments in the public space of the Internet 
itself at least aimed at a democracy of legislative micro­decision­
making, even if its utopic vision could never be compatible with 
the competitive autocracy of corporate telecommunications and 
networking companies and their surveillance overlords.
And so this (unconstitutional) constitutional moment in the 
creation of the internet (RFCs, the IETF and the promise of neu­
trality—all in all a very Rawlsian moment) buckled under the 
weight of power. It still forms a “mystical foundation of authority” 
over both technologists and activists (we who continue to sup­
port net neutrality and an open Internet free of surveillance), 
even as it is systematically dismantled from within through the 
relentless “tyranny of the margin” driving every innovation, every 
update and every act of maintenance.
And so we have instead—as we always seem to—a representative 
democracy. But it is a peculiar one, consisting of an unelected 
expert elite whose most specific desire has been to engineer a 
15system resistant to the power of unelected expert elites. This 
is what accounts for the dreamlike promise of a democratizing 
Internet, but not necessarily a democratically instituted one. The 
dream of a democratizing Internet is not just that it will usher in 
or actualize democracy, but that it will remain perpetually open 
to the future, always revisable. The hope is that one can always 
recall a change, periodically revisit a decision, or balance the 
abuses of today with the possibility of the future. Perhaps.
But there is another side. Imps—of the classical mythical sort—
are not decision makers, but tricksters, gremlins, parasites 
in Michel Serres’ terms. They delight in disrupting the com­
munications of humans. This ambivalent figure remains a 
necessary one when considering the political field of the Inter­
net today. On the one hand, after Snowden, we can harbor no 
illusions of a network free of control, surveillance, conspiracy and 
deception. But nor can we have illusions of a perfectly neutral 
one, a “democratizing one”— this is a fantasy of revolution without 
terror.2 If our nodes are impish at all, they enable the exploits, 
attacks, hacks and pranks that permeate and confuse the con­
temporary network; they introduce unpredictability, confusion, 
breakdown, neurosis: indecision. Perfect control—even for the 
NSA—would remain out of reach.
But even as the decisions are un­ or anti­democratically made, 
they nonetheless produce the communicative ground for 
any kind of public dispute, and from this ground emerges the 
figures of political rationality in the post­Internet era. Neu­
trality, anonymity, privacy, and conspiracy name aspects of this 
political rationality—but they are attributed to an Internet we 
no longer have, an Internet that has been interrupted. It is as 
if the engineers of that old Internet had sent a message saying 
“this network is neutral and democratic”—but it was a long 
time, and many decisions later before the legal scholars, social 
scientists and media theoreticians received it, even though they 
2 I steal this lovely notion from Rosalind Morris.
16 experienced it as being instantaneous, real­time, immediate—
without history even. The network was labeled neutral; our 
map was updated; time­to­live was decremented; the network 
promised to democratize; but the message came too late because 
the message always comes too late.
Title IP Header Decoded:
 – Version: 4
 – Header length: 5 (20 bytes)
 – TOS: 0x3c (See page 11, RFC 791—net neutrality never 
existed)
 – Total Length: 0x2aa5 (10917 bytes—German version will 
vary)
 – Identification: 0xd431 (arbitrary)
 – Flags and Fragments: 0x4000 (Don’t Fragment | 13 bit 
offset)
 – TTL: 0x40 (64 hops)
 – Protocol: 0xfd (Experimental)
 – Header Checksum: 0x478b
 – Source: 0x32740505 (50.116.5.5[kelty.org])
 – Destination: 0x51139126 (81.19.145.38[floriansprenger.
com])


Introduction
Every bit and byte that reaches our devices has already traversed 
a long journey through invisible infrastructures. Such bits arrive 
as parts of data packets from the expanses of digital networks 
and are then processed with other bits into a text, image, or 
sound. Along their way, every bit packet crosses numerous 
nodes where, in the short amount of time required by temporary 
storage and buffers, a series of micro­decisions is made by means 
of established protocols—a decision about the most efficient 
path to the destination, a decision about the processing speed, 
a decision about the priority of incoming packets. These micro­
decisions interrupt the stream of data in order to control its dis­
tribution. The stream never flows uninterruptedly. 
Those decisions are not associated with individual decision­
makers; rather, they are effective because they take place 
automatically—in unfathomable numbers and as quickly as pos­
sible—according to a fixed set of rules.1 They conflate the levels 
of the social and the technical: Their protocological regime was 
determined in negotiation processes between various inter­
est groups and they generate connections or disconnections 
between the people at the end points of the network, but they 
are technically implemented by means of binding protocols for 
1 In his book Protocol, Alexander Galloway extensively describes the 
significance of the Internet ’s protocol architecture as a mode of exercising 
power in societies of control: “Protocol is how technological control exists 
after decentralization” (2004, 8). Building upon this approach, the discussion 
presented here will focus on the micro­decisions that are enabled by this 
protocol architecture. Whereas in Galloway’s work the mechanisms of power 
are more or less unspecified and protocols seem to be merely given, here 
I will address questions concerning the conditions under which power is 
exercised, where it is exercised, and when. Despite the ten years that have 
passed since the publication of Galloway’s book, his arguments remain as 
topical as ever. Thus it seems reasonable to extend his ideas to certain dis­
cussions that have since been taking place, in particular to the discussions 
that have been concerned with net neutrality and Edward Snowden’s leaks.
20 the sequence of processes.2 These strictly determined sequences 
are carried out in a rigidly automated manner without any regard 
for the people communicating and the contents of the com­
munication. Political and economic considerations have been 
made in the background to these micro­decisions, because 
the technical development of digital networks starts with their 
implementation. In their multifaceted nature, such micro­
decisions have been a highly neglected dimension of control and 
surveillance in the twenty­first century, while their importance 
has taken on new shapes in ever emerging digital networks. They 
represent the smallest unit and the technical precondition of a 
present­day network politics—and of our potential opposition to 
it.
Micro­decisions appear at first as an effect of current changes 
and as a technical manifestation of global exertions of power. On 
its own, however, this perspective is insufficient. In light of the 
pervasiveness of global access and the social sphere, forms of 
digital transmission have made it clear how deeply these micro­
decisions are entrenched in the present. This essay is an effort to 
seek out some of their places and times, for it is primarily their 
locality and temporality that can provide us with insight about 
their political dimension. Micro­decisions do not take place in 
parliaments, political hot spots, or police stations but rather in 
data­processing centers or server farms at the level of technical 
infrastructures. They are also at home on our own computers, 
devices, and gadgets. Their places are the nodes of networks.
The time of micro­decisions is the interruption that stops every 
transmission at every given node, so that decisions can be made 
about the direction and priority of its journey ahead. Without 
these decisions there is no transmission. The fact that transmis­
sions are constantly interrupted not only means that they are 
2 Laura DeNardis (2014) has provided the most recent discussion of Inter­
net governance, the political significance of establishing protocols and 
standards, and the difficulties associated with their implementation.
21never completed in putative real­time, that people are never 
connected immediately, and that we have no direct access to the 
world we are connected to. Interruptions are also the precon­
dition for decisions. Decisions require time. The interruptions 
free up this time by adding durations of stasis to the temporality 
of transmissions. These durations occur at places of decision­
making whose location can be determined, namely at network 
nodes that are subject to governmental or economic authority 
and depend on technological developments. In order to map 
out the extent of these decisions, it is necessary to know when, 
where, how, and why transmissions have been interrupted 
instead of simply dismissing interruptions as temporary setbacks 
to the success of communication. 
All decisions regarding further transmission in one direction or 
another or in one sequence or another are thus tied to specific 
preconditions in space and time. That said, they should not be 
understood as intentional, human acts. Rather, their effective­
ness derives precisely from their automation, their sheer number, 
and their speed, all of which surpass human understanding 
because of their involvement at every second in the transmis­
sion of every bit packet. Micro­decisions have always been made 
by computers for computers. In terms of the logic of decision­
making, the basis of all computers and their networks is not only 
structured on the level of binary code but also on that of the 
protocols that produce connections and disconnections, partic­
ipation and non­participation. 
The purpose of this essay is to trace some of the origins of the 
Internet’s architectures—understood as the rules and plans that 
organize its structure—and the development of its places and 
times and thus, from a historical perspective, to come closer to 
understanding some of their underlying technical preconditions 
and political and economic goals. What will become apparent is 
that such micro­decisions can reveal much about the state of the 
political systems in which they are made. Whereas their protocols 
have been discussed in great detail by the likes of Alexander 
22 Galloway and Eugene Thacker, and a number of studies—by Janet 
Abbate, Sebastian Gießmann, Mercedes Bunz, for example—have 
been devoted to the general history of the Internet, the focus 
here will rest on the role of the decisions themselves. In order to 
understand our present situation and the current state of digital 
cultures, we are in urgent need of some insight into the scope of 
these decisions. It is hoped that such insight might allow us to 
contest future decisions of this sort before they are made and to 
identify possible alternatives.
A Civil War on the Internet
As abstract as the preconditions of such decisions might seem 
at this point, their consequences are quite concrete. In fact, if 
any faith can be had in the urgent ideas of the theorist Harry 
Halpin, an “immaterial civil war” is presently being fought over 
the sovereignty of digital networks (2013). Representatives 
of the new world stand in opposition to those who wish to 
transfer the relations of the old, pre­digital world into the new. 
Micro­decisions are central instruments for exercising a type of 
sovereign power that is valid in both worlds. Their standards, 
architectures, and protocols are currently up for grabs. Halpin 
and many activists tend to believe that the original architecture 
of the Internet represents a guarantee for its democratic, pacifist, 
and freedom­securing function and that net neutrality is a 
fundamental digital right. Nonetheless, the necessity of decisions 
is already ingrained in this architecture as well, however dem­
ocratically it had indeed been conceived. In other words, there 
can be no Internet without control (though certainly without 
surveillance) and there can be no transmission without the 
exertion of power (though certainly without discrimination).3 
3 Chris Kelty (2014b) has argued that freedom in digital cultures has to be 
implemented in technologies in order to be effective and to oppose their 
neutralization.
23All things are equal to the protocol that governs the decisions. 
Hierarchies and conventions of appropriate behavior are 
established only after the implementation of the protocol. The 
protocol’s task is to generate this hierarchy. Yet everything 
about which decisions are made and can thus be transmitted 
must, according to Galloway, take the form that the protocol has 
predetermined for the purpose of processing: “Standardisation 
is the political reactionary tactic that enables radical openness” 
(2004, 143). The possibility of sending various types of data on 
the Internet is based on the rigid standards that have been set by 
protocols for decisions. If something does not possess the prede­
termined form, it does not appear on the Internet. The content 
of these forms (that is, of our emails, our telephone calls, and our 
browser histories), however, is separated from the decision, and 
today it is a matter of dispute whether that which is transmitted 
even ought to be decoupled from the process of transmission. 
Efforts are being made from various sides to know the contents 
of communication or to make its transmission more profitable. 
Some of the front lines of such disputes are taking place under 
the banner of so­called net neutrality. In light of the leaks 
released by Edward Snowden, moreover, it is now quite clear to 
see what is at stake. My thoughts below will operate between 
the two poles of net neutrality and the surveillance practices 
of the National Security Agency (NSA), which ought not to be 
separated from one another but are only seldom united. Both 
are essentially based on the same media­technical possibilities 
provided by micro­decisions. In technical and political terms, the 
places and times are by and large identical at which net neu­
trality ceases and NSA surveillance begins: in the interruption of 
transmissions at the nodes of the network. It is therefore all the 
more important to consider the context of both arguments. They 
are two sides of a coin that has been imprinted in equal measure 
by the technologies and architectures of transmission. In many 
senses, they admittedly point in different directions—they are 
concerned with different economies, different political intentions, 
24 and different legal foundations. From the perspective of media 
theory as presented here, however, their uses are closely related 
and their positions in the present are adjacent. 
The following discussion will revolve around issues of control 
taken as the distribution of data that takes place at the nodes 
and backbones of providers. Thus control, on the one hand, 
means access to the header in order to examine whether a packet 
satisfies the protocol’s requirements. On the other hand, con­
trol means regulating the decisions for routing. Surveillance, on 
the contrary, I understand to be the attempts to gain access to 
knowledge about the content of packets or to gain information 
about the social networks of those who are communicating by 
means of meta­data analysis and graph­theoretical applications. 
This distinction between control and surveillance is important 
because the control of a network can be automated and can thus 
form a necessary component of network architecture without any 
surveillance, though the potential for surveillance is necessarily 
implied. Ultimately, and despite the ever­growing potential of 
its automation, surveillance can always be traced back to an act 
of intention, and to that extent it is anything but arbitrary. For 
there is an entire series of actors who are not only interested 
in the knowledge generated by such automated surveillance; 
they are also capable of establishing or undermining the rules of 
protocols. Providers would like to distinguish time­critical data 
from data that is less time­critical in order to fulfill demands in a 
more customer­friendly manner and maintain their commercial 
network operations. Intelligence services and cyber­criminals live 
off of this sort of knowledge.
In recent years, intensive debates have taken place about 
whether providers—which grant Internet access to paying 
customers and which own and operate the Internet nodes or 
hubs through which all traffic has to pass—should treat all data 
packets equally without any intervention or whether they should 
be allowed to look at data packets before they transport them. 
These debates, which will be treated in the first part of this essay, 
25have been fueled by a controversial reality: In order to give 
preferential treatment to one packet or another, the packet’s 
contents must be known. The surveillance of data traffic implies 
a non­neutral Internet. The opposite is true of control as a form 
of data management: It is the precondition of data traffic and 
thus the precondition of neutrality as well. In common Internet 
protocols, control guarantees that anything can be transmitted at 
all, and this is because all packets are treated equally. Decisions 
about the sequence, speed, and reliability of transmissions in this 
sense are supposed to be neutral, which means that the control 
over the distribution of packets should disregard their content, 
volume, users, services, or applications. Such micro­decisions 
can only be neutral if what is being transmitted is unknown. In 
an ideal manner, and on account of encryption, this happens to 
be the case with the Internet protocol TCP/IP because the latter 
only allows for headers to be read. At the present moment, it is 
precisely this issue that is being reevaluated by Internet providers 
and undermined by the NSA and other intelligence services, while 
agencies such as the US Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) are trying to establish legal foundations for sustainable net 
neutrality. Nonetheless, based on the same technical foundation, 
the hardware used by all of the actors begins to operate at the 
same location and at the same time: in the interruption of trans­
missions for the purpose of making a decision. 
Control is based on the meta­data from the header of a packet, 
which, like a parcel label, has to be legible to every node and 
contain the sender’s address, the address of the destination, and 
other instructions for processing.4 In the case of control in the 
4 The legal status of such meta­data is largely unclear. Whereas the American 
government argues that meta­data are not private because their acces­
sibility is necessary simply for sending a message—that is, its sender 
inevitably allows such data to be read by a third party—a legal decision 
on this matter has yet to be made. For the moment, the NSA’s large­scale 
collection of meta­data is justified by Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which 
allows such measures to be taken for the purpose of fighting terrorism even 
without a court order. For this reason, Barack Obama stressed in his first 
26 sense of network management, these meta­data are typically not 
stored. With the help of graph­theoretical processes, however, 
their patterns can be made to reveal a great deal of information 
about their contents. They indicate interconnections and target 
criteria. The meta­data gathered from mobile media are far 
more informative than those of static addresses because they 
include profiles about a given user’s movement.5 Accordingly, 
surveillance is not necessarily dependent on viewing content; 
it can also operate on the basis of the patterns and addresses 
that are subject to controls. In this way, an act of surveillance can 
secretly target a transmission that is seemingly neutral and thus 
undermine this neutrality. Even the traffic monitored by the NSA 
can be transmitted in a net­neutral manner, but then this neu­
trality is worth far less than it seems. 
The debates held about these questions are the most recent and 
perhaps the most exciting expression of the demand that the 
rules for such decisions should not be established in private or 
secretively (that is, without the participation of those concerned) 
but should rather be negotiated publicly. In these debates, and 
quite consequentially, the technical foundations of the Inter­
net and political demands are blended together according to a 
democratic basis of networking—in other words, it has become 
clear that Internet politics cannot be managed without technical 
public statement about Snowden that the government makes a strong dis­
tinction between content and meta­data (see White House 2013). There are 
signs, however, that the US Supreme Court will argue, after the expiration 
of the Patriot Act in June 2015, that digital networks have changed the con­
ditions and our understanding of privacy to such a great extent that new 
guidelines will be necessary for classifying meta­data as private. In that 
case, the NSA would need court approval to collect the data of any single 
person (see M. Cohn 2014). In Europe, this decision has already been made: 
Like IP addresses, meta­data are treated as private according to the EU’s 
privacy and data­protection laws.
5 For instance, whoever uses the Android operating system on his or her 
smart phone and has connected its location­based services with Google 
Maps can view the location data that Google has stored at http://maps.
google.com/locationhistory/.
27knowledge and that technical networks can never be unpolitical. 
The deliberations therefore view networks not as explanations 
but rather as something to be explained, following the intuition of 
Chris Kelty (2014a). In this regard, as Geert Lovink has suggested, 
the event of Snowden’s revelations has brought an end to the age 
of “new media,” washed away the final vestiges of naive cyber 
euphoria, and underscored with the utmost clarity that the Inter­
net is a political space (2014). 
In order to understand what is at stake in all of this, the second 
half of this essay will adopt a media­archaeological approach and 
focus on a technical paper by Paul Baran. Published in 1964, “On 
Distributed Communications Networks” provides the theoretical 
foundations of what we today call the Internet (1964d). Using 
the term “packet switching,” Baran was the first to formulate the 
principle of basing a transmission network for digital data, which 
have been divided into packets, on micro­decisions that are made 
at every node and no longer simply on data processing at the 
transmission or receiving stages. His work provides a blueprint 
for the current debates because it designates the very times and 
places of decision­making that are still valid today. In light of the 
changed nature of the challenges that face us, a return to Baran’s 
paper will make it obvious which epistemological preconditions 
the present technical processes are still obeying, how they 
have managed to conceal these preconditions, and where their 
political potential or danger lies.
Sociality and Technology
To speak about “decisions” and to borrow this concept from 
social theory does not yet entail that there is any social intention 
behind their procedure. In the case of every micro­decision 
made on digital networks with the help of protocols, the power 
to make decisions has rather been taken out of the hands of 
human decision­makers and given to machines. The machines 
that carry out the decisions are of course produced and man­
aged by people, who also determine and program their protocols 
28 and algorithms. Even the measures according to which decisions 
are made are necessarily established in protracted institutional 
negotiations. Yet, the great mass of micro­decisions can only be 
executed by computers, and it is this mass that underlies the 
technical definitions of the success of digital communication on 
computer­supported networks. They have become as effective as 
they are precisely because they circumvent the laborious human 
act of what could be called decision­making. 
The act of deciding should not be confused with the process 
of choosing a possible answer by means of decision­making. 
It is dealt with by means of protocols and algorithms. In a 
technical and mathematical context, a de­cision (Ent-Scheidung) 
is also more than the execution of a predetermined protocol 
or programmed algorithm. Micro­decisions are in no way 
merely mechanical, determined, and therefore sub­complex 
processes. As interruptions, they are a fixed component of all 
communication on digital networks. Who can be connected 
with whom and who is disconnected from whom depend on 
these decisions. The precondition of every connection is its 
interruption.
Thus, instead of speaking about the technical determination of 
social processes or the precedence of social intentions before 
technical processes, the perspective followed here calls for a 
sort of procedural escalation, one that plays back and forth 
between automated execution and political interests, between 
the technical and the social. However important they might be 
to understanding digital cultures, descriptions of algorithms and 
protocols alone have not elucidated acts of decision­making so 
far. Such acts entail their own sort of politics and are not con­
gruent with the commissions that establish protocols. A power 
analysis of present digital cultures should therefore operate 
in terms of technical infrastructures, their re­configurations of 
the social, and thus without drawing a line between human and 
technical actors.
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means of digital networks but also the capacity of these groups 
to act. Only by creating connections in networks and a type of 
connectivity based on material foundations is it possible for 
the sort of collectivity to develop that Eugene Thacker (2004) 
has referred to as an “aggregation of individuated units”—the 
kind that can organize itself for the sake of collective action. 
Connectivity is thus a precondition of collectivity, of intentional 
groups that are capable of action, but it does not inevitably 
result in collectivity. Thacker does not explicitly state the reverse 
side of his argument: The destruction of connectivity impairs 
collectivity. Who is connected with whom determines who can act 
in common. To determine the creation of disconnections or con­
nections—to maintain or hinder them—is thus to exercise power, 
a sort of power that gains significance almost daily in light of the 
relations that are multiplied by digital media and the economic 
exploitation of these relations.
What so far might still sound schematic gains a degree of urgency 
if, as is the goal of this essay, one goes beyond examining the 
history of these networks in parallel with the history of political 
movements and their reconfigurations of the social (see, for 
instance, Baxmann et al. 2015). The challenges of pre­digital 
networks and their technologies also concerned the life­world 
(Lebenswelt), for they pertained to the manner in which people 
were connected with one another or disconnected from one 
another. Without question, the French Revolution can no less be 
separated from the printed pamphlet than the Arab Spring can 
be separated from Twitter and Facebook, albeit certainly not in 
a monocausal sense. Yet, while these familiar theses, in their 
grand claim to think about the intertwined nature of society and 
technology, oscillate between the poles of presumably neutral 
technology and outright techno­determinism, the focus of what 
follows will pertain to a different level, one that has been short­
changed in recent theoretical discussions: My concern will be the 
places and times of micro­decisions about transmissions, the 
30 cultural techniques of synchronization that coordinate technical 
processes (see Kassung and Macho 2012), or, to be more specific, 
the infrastructures with which digital data packets are distributed 
on the Internet, connections and interruptions are produced, and 
networks are limited or broken down. From this history, it will 
become clear how much we know about the world and how much 
of what we are able to do is still being decided, prior to any con­
tent, at the level of technical media—but it should also become 
clear where their limits lie.
With its goal to examine the places and times of decision­making, 
this essay is meant for Internet activists and media historians, 
hackers and archaeologists, politicians and cultural theorists. 
Just as I intend to sketch the development of a political field, 
I also wish to illustrate that the history of a medium is always 
political and should not withdraw itself from the present that 
has emerged from it. That said, I nevertheless try to remain true 
to Georges Canguilhem’s premise that epistemology always 
takes place among the rearguard (2006). We cannot confront 
the present because we are living in it. We may take action in 
it, appropriate it, and thus understand it. Yet, in doing so, we 
are not able to comprehend its epistemology, the orders of 
its knowledge. From a historical perspective, however, we can 
formulate a critique of the present without submitting ourselves 
unconditionally to the compulsion to be current that will make all 
of the circumstances of this book seem obsolete as soon as it is 
printed. According to Michel Foucault, a genealogy narrates the 
history of that which has come about and thus confronts what 
has become with its contingency: It is possible for everything 
to have been different, and it is possible that everything will be 
different (see Foucault 1997 and Saar 2008). To write a critique—
even and particularly as regards the decisions that are being 
made about connections and disconnections—is therefore to 
create a space for that which is not inevitable and to invalidate 
what might seem to be a matter of course. 
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decision is ineluctable and that every decision can be reached 
in a different manner—that it is possible to modify them for the 
better, but that they can also turn out for the worse. Yet even a 
bad decision is better than no decision, which leaves no room for 
improvement. To make decisions in advance or even to abolish 
the act of decision­making is, in every case, to reduce what is 
possible.

Control and  
Surveillance
Challenges to net neutrality and the revelation of seamless 
surveillance on the part of intelligence services, which are inter­
connected in ways that will be discussed below, have a technical, 
political, and epistemological dimension.6 The objective of this 
chapter is to conceptualize these dimensions in an integrative 
manner. Actors as diverse as the EU Parliament, telecom­
munications providers, computer scientists, service providers, 
the FCC, Internet activists, hackers, and legal experts are 
negotiating the solution to a technical problem that has inter­
vened with the Internet as an entity subject to politics—an entity, 
6 Comments by media theorists about these debates have been rare, apart 
from those by Sebastian Gießmann, Dietmar Kammerer, Johannes Paßmann 
and Gregoire Chamayou (see Gießmann 2015, Kammerer 2015, Paßmann 
2014, Chamayou 2015). This is surprising because, beyond the importance 
of these debates to daily politics, they are also of great theoretical interest; 
they refine central concepts such as surveillance, control, communication, 
or transmission and help to update them for the state of the twenty­first 
century. They illustrate where it is possible for historically­oriented media 
studies to intervene in current discussions and make its perspectives con­
ducive to political critique.
34 therefore, that goes beyond distributing information but is also 
concerned with the order of distribution itself. To understand 
the collision of these aspects, it is necessary to examine the 
technical structure of the Internet, its transmission procedures, 
and the negotiation processes that have taken place in order 
to determine its architecture. Its origins will be discussed more 
extensively in the next chapter with reference to Paul Baran’s 
model of a network. For this perspective, the calculation methods 
and algorithms used at the nodes and for the protocols are of 
little importance (they are also not commented upon in the his­
torical texts consulted here). Of far greater significance are the 
network­architectonic questions concerning the layout of nodes, 
the distribution of data, and the production of connections. For it 
is only on this level that the tightly intertwined nature of technical 
solutions, political processes, and epistemological challenges will 
become clear. 
End-to-End: The Architecture of 
Intermediacy
In simple terms, the various network architectures of the Internet 
are based on the fact that all transmitted data are graded into 
small, standardized packets, which each take various paths from 
node to node. At each node, the packets from various senders 
are processed according to the order of their arrival, and their 
further routes are determined in relation to the load of the net­
work by means of the so­called header, which is analogous to a 
parcel label. No one has to plan or know which path a packet will 
take. Because traffic at the nodes is forwarded along without 
regard for its origin, the hardware being employed, and its con­
tent but rather exclusively according to the formalized manner 
provided by the protocol, users and service providers can thus 
be certain that data will arrive at their destination just as they 
have been sent. In principle, this process was conceived from the 
very beginning—that is, since the time of larger­scale capacities 
35per user before the development of the World Wide Web in 
the 1990s—to be an open, equality­based, and fundamentally 
non­discriminatory way of dealing with all packets. Even then, 
however, this process was inscribed with the necessity of 
organizing incoming packets at the nodes and of caring for the 
management of their distribution. 
What servers and routers are meant to accomplish at the nodes 
was defined in 1973—nine years after Baran’s publication and at 
a time when providers were university­based computing centers 
or research facilities—by the computer scientists Vinton Cerf and 
Robert Kahn in their authoritative paper titled “A Protocol for 
Packet Network Intercommunication” (Cerf and Kahn 1973). This 
paper describes the still­valid rules for distribution known as the 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), which puts data into the 
form of a packet and supplies them with a readable header (see 
Galloway 2004, 41 and, for a general introduction, Bunz 2009). 
Developed at the same time, the Internet Protocol (IP) assigns 
addresses to the packets, is responsible for routing the data 
packets, and passes along incoming data from an application 
to the network access of a given computer. Combined into TCP/
IP, the protocol ensures that, within a distributed network, all 
or as many packets as possible will arrive at their destination. 
It is essentially a so­called connectionless protocol, for it is 
unnecessary to know whether a connection exists before a 
transmission is sent. In connection­oriented processes, which 
are used above all to manage telephone traffic, it is tested in 
advance whether there is a direct connection to the transmis­
sion’s destination. TCP serves to create this connection in the act 
of transmission and during the transport itself, so that various 
application protocols—such as the File Transfer Protocol (FTP), 
the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), or the Hypertext 
36 Transfer Protocol (HTTP)—are applicable across a network and 
multiple people can use the same line at once.7
According to the model presented by Cerf and Kahn, nodes 
operate as black boxes, simply and in an error­resistant manner, 
but they have no involvement with what passes through them 
on the basis of various types of hardware. In an influential article 
from 1984, the MIT computer scientists Jerome Saltzer, David 
Reed, and David Clark (everyone involved at this stage was 
male) referred to this structure as the “end­to­end principle.” 
According to this principle, a network can “completely and 
correctly be implemented only with the knowledge and the 
help of the application standing at the end points of the com­
munication system” (Saltzer et al. 1984, 287; see also Bendrath 
and Mueller 2010; Gillespie 2006). Conversely, this implies that 
only the programs at the terminals are responsible for process­
ing and for maintaining the neutrality of the nodes, which alone 
possess the capacity for routing. In this sense, neutrality does not 
mean that no decisions are made but that they remain indepen­
dent of the transmitted content and of the hardware being used 
on both sides.8 Accordingly, as stated in 1984, the protocol does 
not determine the acts of decision­making but rather their set of 
rules.
The access allowed by the protocol is therefore restricted to 
the header and nothing can be implemented on the basis of the 
data in the body. In a Request for Comments (RFC) from 1996 (an 
RFC is an organizational, public document with which computer 
scientists coordinate and standardize the form of networks), 
7 For the technical details of various protocol levels, see the helpful 
introduction by Jürgen Plate (2004).
8 Some providers, however, have done away with hardware neutrality by 
means of compulsory routers. For their own commercial interests, such 
providers allow particular models or functions, but only after a fee has 
been paid. In this regard it is also clear that the industry’s openness to 
different types of hardware was driven by economic interests from the very 
beginning.
37Brian Carpenter, a network engineer at CERN in Switzerland, 
described the end­to­end principle as an essential element of 
Internet architecture: “The network’s job is to transmit datagrams 
as efficiently and flexibly as possible. Everything else should be 
done at the fringes” (1996). This principle, which was gradually 
refined, ensures that nodes can transport all packets indepen­
dent of their assigned application, their content, the user in ques­
tion, and the hardware being employed. What happens with the 
data in the packets is determined by the applications on the ter­
minals. To summarize with three points, end­to­end allows for (1) 
flexibility with respect to technical solutions, because the nodes 
are not involved in computing processes; (2) the political freedom 
of content, because every participant can send anything; and 
finally (3) economic potential, because new services can develop 
without obstruction.
Because the intake and processing capacities of every node are 
technically limited, the threat exists, despite elaborate syn­
chronization processes, that a transmission will be delayed or 
that packets will be lost when the network is overloaded. In 
accordance with the original protocol, packets are processed 
at the nodes as quickly as possible in the order of their arrival 
(this is known as the “best­effort principle”). When the number 
of arriving packets exceeds the availability of buffers or process­
ing time, they will disappear or be discarded: “If all available 
buffers are used up, succeeding arrivals can be discarded since 
unacknowledged packets will be retransmitted” (Cerf and Kahn 
1974, 645). This does not represent a problem because, within 
this model, the loss of packets is already taken into account: 
“No transmission can be 100 percent reliable” (ibid., 644). Since 
Baran’s time, the redundancy of transmission has been the 
highest goal of every network model, and the idea was carried 
on by Cerf and Kahn: The network should remain operational not 
only if nodes are eliminated but also if individual packets are lost. 
Replacement deliveries are therefore requested automatically 
by the previous node if something is missing. The receiving node 
38 sends a confirmation for the packet to the previous node, and 
the digital copy on the output node is deleted. If no delivery 
confirmation is received, the packet is simply resent along a 
different route. However, in light of the vast amounts of data 
that have been increasing since the global spread of the Internet, 
noticeable delays can be experienced, even for the user at home, 
when the nodes are overloaded during periods of high traffic and 
requests are not even being sent.
Transmission	Traffic	Jams
The current debates predominantly revolve around how 
providers have been dealing with such traffic jams. Though the 
evocation of bottlenecks is part of a rhetoric of overload and 
most of the interested parties believe in it and benefit from it, the 
network rarely crashes. Apart from the possible overload and the 
background of regulation, the question of capacities of transmis­
sion leads to the center of technical challenges. Traffic jams stand 
in opposition to the potentially unlimited nature of digital data. 
In order to preserve the accustomed quality of transmissions, 
there are two options at our disposal. The first is expensive and 
comes with no guarantee of profit: to expand the infrastructures 
by further developing the network, which has been promoted in 
Germany by the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infra­
structure. The second option is to use the existing, suboptimal 
capacities in an optimized manner. Apparently it is more profit­
able to sell the present capacity at a higher price to those who 
are willing to pay for “fast lanes” and slow down the traffic for 
everyone else, something that Tim Berners­Lee, the developer of 
the World Wide Web, recently referred to as “bribery” (see Fung 
2014). The goal of providers, as is clear to see in the case of Deut­
sche Telekom, is to make better use of the network by only slowly 
increasing its capacity, that is, to earn larger profits with merely 
marginal additional costs.
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of all users on the network led the Chaos Computer Club (CCC) 
to issue a moderate public statement: The prioritization of data 
for the purpose of bandwidth management would be acceptable 
“if this is made transparent to the customer, if it is stipulated in 
the contract, and if in fact a capacity traffic jam exists, that is, if 
the influence serves to allow all customers to have a fair portion 
of the existing capacity” (2010). The CCC has drawn attention to 
the fact that an insufficient infrastructural upgrade has led to 
an increase of traffic jams and that sustainable action has to be 
taken in response to this. Prioritization may be a poor solution, 
but perhaps it might occasionally be necessary under transparent 
conditions. Going beyond the position of the CCC, one could even 
surmise that, in sufficiently complex data networks, it is in fact 
the rule that capacity cannot keep up with use, and thus we have 
a systemic problem on our hands. 
Strictly speaking, the faltering network development at least in 
Germany (faltering because there is a lack of incentive) has on 
its own ensured a sort of sustainable net neutrality because 
neutrality is not a problem if there is sufficient capacity. Its 
endorsement implies an endorsement for the improvement 
of infrastructures, which poses its own set of questions and 
problems: Who will finance them and to whom will they belong? 
What power will materialize in them and on what legal basis can 
they be democratically appropriated? For, as has been known 
since the nineteenth century, the development of large infra­
structural networks requires an uncanny accumulation of capital. 
Networks of power, which the historian of technology Thomas 
P. Hughes described in his monumental work on the rise of the 
large American electricity companies, are too tightly entangled 
with the rise of capitalism (1993). It is hardly novel to remark 
that the development of infrastructures invites conflict. In the 
case of network development alone, which is unquestionably 
momentous and inevitable, it seems unlikely that this solution 
40 will solve the many challenges that go beyond the mere man­
agement of bandwidth.
It has become increasingly difficult, moreover, to interpret the 
interests of the individual actors involved. Neutrality, as has 
already become clear, lies in the hands of the providers, whereas 
lawmakers around the world have been asked to create legal 
frameworks (see Marsden 2010). However, in light of the NSA 
scandal and the evident cooperation of many providers with 
intelligence services, this division of labor has become somewhat 
diffuse. Providers make their own rules and states such as China 
or the United States, colluding with the providers, monitor large 
swaths of traffic in a way that can hardly be called neutral. This is 
all the more reason to try to understand what is at stake with net 
neutrality.
The concept of net neutrality was coined by Tim Wu in a series 
of legal and political debates.9 Together with the constitutional 
lawyer Lawrence Lessig, Wu was intensively engaged with the 
political issues and the technical challenges of net neutrality in 
order to shift the discussion away from judicial matters toward 
questions of civil rights (Wu 2003; see also van Schewick 2010). 
According to Wu’s definition, net neutrality guarantees that, 
within a network, all types of information are transmitted 
equally and the widest variety of applications can be supported, 
which would enable democratic participation in the social 
processes that are based on it. For Wu, net neutrality is therefore 
embedded in the structure of the Internet, in which images, texts, 
and sounds are processed independently: “The principle suggests 
that information networks are often more valuable when they are 
less specialized, when they are a platform for multiple use” (2015). 
9 Before becoming a professor at Columbia Law School, Wu was employed 
by a company devoted to deep packet inspection (2009). In 2014, he was a 
candidate in the Democratic primary for lieutenant governor in the state of 
New York.
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cerned with economic issues. Net neutrality is promoted in the 
name of not hindering the Internet’s potential for innovation 
(read: profit) by eliminating online advertising.10 The fear is that 
large providers could exploit their position as gatekeepers in 
order to impede or block competition, a fear that was recently 
substantiated by the much­discussed case of T­Mobile blocking 
Skype from its mobile network.11 Competition is especially fierce 
in the sector of mobile Internet devices because wireless data 
transmission, on account of the radio spectrum, has physically 
limited capacities that cannot be expanded. For this reason, the 
providers of such services have long been selective about what 
type of traffic is given preferential treatment on mobile networks. 
For example, the use of fee­based streaming services such as 
Spotify is frequently not counted as part of a customer’s data 
plan. Terms of use can thus cut access to the Internet. There have 
likewise been attempts to involve the main commercial contrib­
utors to so much traffic—most notably Google, YouTube, and 
Netflix—in paying for the costs of the infrastructures that they 
benefit from but neglect to finance. Providers plan on charging 
for giving advertisers access to customers. What remains to be 
decided in all of this is the nature of the relationship between the 
owners of the infrastructure and those who use it—the user, on 
the one hand, and the provider on the other.12 
10 For an overview of the economic and legal issues, see Krämer et al. (2013) 
and Martini (2011). It is noteworthy that these texts neglect to discuss the 
controversial surveillance that has taken place by means of deep packet 
inspection.
11 The transmission of voices, which I will return to below, is especially sus­
ceptible to fluctuations in transmission quality because it tolerates neither 
delays in the transmission (“latency”) nor irregular sequences of arriving 
data packets (“jitters”). The inconsistency of Skype conversations dem­
onstrates this quite clearly. More than that of other types of content, the 
transmission of voices and video relies on a rigid sort of time management 
to guarantee the impression of being present. 
12 On the legal and political dimensions of these developments, see the interim 
report by the project group devoted to net neutrality as part of the German 
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benefits of open networks extensively (see Lessig 2004; Mueller 
2004). As far as he is concerned, it is precisely by being neutral 
that the Internet can generate new markets that are meant to be 
accessible to everyone in a free society. In his opinion, it is only 
in exceptional cases, such as Internet television or Voice over 
IP services (VoIP) for the police or military, that it is sensible for 
providers to abolish neutrality. This is because such services 
can only maintain their standards with stable connections and 
would thus be at a disadvantage in comparison with other types. 
In other words, some sort of special status should be accorded 
to infrastructure that is critical. That said, a general limitation 
on traffic would contradict Metcalfe’s Law, according to which 
the value of a network is proportional to the number of pos­
sible connections between its users, whereby the costs of the 
network remain proportional merely to its number of users.13 If 
hierarchies come to prevail between a network’s nodes, the value 
of this network will decrease.
As Wu’s and Lessig’s interventions have repeatedly pointed 
out, the question of whether data packets should be treated 
unequally on the Internet is a matter that, beyond economic 
issues, concerns the democratic conception of the Internet, which 
in turn is based on the end­to­end principle. Proponents of net 
neutrality frequently draw conclusions about the freedom of 
expression and economic prosperity on the basis of the technical 
conditions of the Internet itself. In Lessig’s words, “This imposed 
neutrality about how the wires would be used left the field open 
for others to use the wires in ways no one ever expected. The 
government’s investigative committee on the Internet and digital society 
(Enquete-Kommission Internet und digitale Gesellschaft; Deutscher Bundestag 
2012). Employing the methodology of Science and Technology Studies, 
Sebastian Gießmann (2015) has investigated the various forms of collab­
oration that, within the framework of this committee, brought about the 
demand for net neutrality and infrastructural­political standards. 
13 This law, which was suggested in the late 1980s by Robert Metcalfe, was first 
properly formulated in 1993 by George Gilder (2000).
43internet was one such way” (2004, 149). The absence of an over­
arching authority for making decisions and the detachment of 
protocols from institutional authority in general can be under­
stood as an opportunity for democratic organization and for 
carrying out Article 19 of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. The latter not only calls for the freedom of expression; it 
also endorses the right “to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” (United 
Nations 1948). 
The debates of recent years have been ignited by the fact that 
the infrastructures necessary for the Internet have come to form 
the foundation of a new type of public sphere. As such, their 
social value is greater than the business interests of the private 
companies that own them. It is rather difficult to reconcile their 
pursuit of profit with the maintenance of these structures, which 
are so vital to modern society. As the media theorist Johannes 
Paßmann has shown, such an understanding of net neutrality is 
the continuation of the dream, which is enormously important 
to the constitution of the Internet, of establishing a democratic 
medium, something similar to what was expressed in John Perry 
Barlow’s emailed Internet manifesto from 1996. At that time, the 
Internet promised to be an open and democratic social order 
that, like today, had to be protected from the potential influences 
of private business. According to Paßmann (2014), today’s 
recourse to these positions implicitly maintains that something 
like neutral use could even exist and that a neutral market situ­
ation could even be conceivable, which, in light of the dominant 
position of the large companies, is hardly the case. Put simply, we 
are now facing a conflict over the distribution of resources, and 
this conflict will determine who can be connected with whom and 
who will know anything about it.
The proclaimed fear that all data packets will no longer be 
sent without discrimination by all providers consists primarily, 
according to the activists at Netzpolitik.org or La Quadrature du 
Net, in the fact that private companies will decide what will be 
44 transmitted and what will not. It is around this question of sov­
ereignty that Halpin’s idea of an “immaterial civil war” revolves. 
The reverse side of prioritization is discrimination. This is so 
because, first, less bandwidth will be available to non­prioritized 
users and, second, because the possibility of various sorts of 
surveillance, control, and obstruction will thus appear on the 
horizon. According to activists, the long­term consequence of 
abolishing net neutrality would be to forfeit the democratic 
function of the Internet, which they claim to be a fundamental 
component of the open society of the twenty­first century and, 
as is especially argued in North America, a precondition for the 
innovative potential of new services and thus of the economic 
dimension of networking.14 From this perspective, net neutrality 
serves the common good.
The counterargument from industry is that, in light of the 
increasing amount of data traffic, it is only by controlling and 
regulating transmissions that a satisfactory user experience on 
the Internet will even be possible. In an internal memo from 2010 
entitled What Does Net Neutrality Really Mean?, Deutsche Telekom 
mentions “innovative network management” and “different 
classes of quality,” the goal of which is to enhance the “quality of 
services” and to promote “an efficient use of network resources.” 
In metaphorical terms, the congestion of the data highway should 
be countered by a traffic control system that not only makes 
use of signs to ensure the flow of traffic but also inspects the 
occupants of the cars in order to see who has to reach his or her 
destination more quickly—ambulances and vehicles carrying 
hazardous materials will be given priority by the authorities, 
while paying customers will be given priority over those unwilling 
to pay.15 Out of the need, brought about by increasing volume, 
14 My attention here is restricted to the debates that have been taking place 
in Western Europe and North America. For a more broadly international 
comparison, see Bertscheck et al. (2013).
15 Of course, this metaphor is anything but innocent, but it already presents a 
solution in the form of toll roads. 
45not only to control but also regulate data traffic, providers 
are abandoning the practice of treating everything equally 
and instead giving preference to those who are willing to pay 
more. For everyone involved, however, the price (or the profit) 
is that the content of every car and every data packet will have 
to be inspected in order for this act of selection to take place. 
Prioritization—and this point is central—entails that the decisions 
made at nodes will be based on the providers’ knowledge about 
what is being transmitted. 
Deep Packet Inspection
There are a number of reasons why these debates have res­
onated so strongly and why they have been carried out so 
vehemently not only among lawyers and economists but also, 
for some years, online. First, and as shown above, their historical 
location lies in the large­scale spread of volume­independent 
tariffs and flat fees, which, in a mixed calculation, offsets the 
intensive use of certain users against the more minimal use 
of others. The primary causes of this explosion of traffic have 
been peer­to­peer applications such as Bittorrent or eMule, 
the steadily increasing amounts of data required by cloud­
based services and online gaming, the increase of spam, and 
the growing popularity of fluctuation­sensitive services such as 
video telephony, streaming, or the convergence of television and 
the Internet.16 This, in turn, is likewise dependent on a technical 
necessity: The transmission of an email is less time­critical than 
that of a video call. The latter has to arrive on time at its des­
tination in order to minimize interruption. Among other inter­
ested parties, medical services and law enforcement agencies 
have thus repeatedly demanded that quality assurances be 
16 See Blumenthal and Clark (2001). It has been suggested, moreover, that 
streaming services should abandon packet switching and return to using 
line­based transmission, which does not rely on individual packets running 
through various nodes but rather on a single connection that would save 
energy and processing time (see Sietmann 2011).
46 established by giving priority to such services. To the extent 
that these services are subject to commercial interests and their 
providers stand to earn profits from them, however, the latter 
are confronted with a homemade problem. It has become more 
and more evident that the architecture of the Internet is not 
suitable for video services, which are based on the principle of 
broadcasting, that is, on distributing the same content to multiple 
users. Because of insufficient investments in development, too, it 
is inevitable that the infrastructure will be overloaded for a long 
time to come. 
The conflict, however, has not yet reached the point where 
it is simply a matter of private providers clashing with public 
interests. This is because, second, processes of deep packet 
inspection have been perfected in recent years that, in addition 
to the big­data analysis of metadata, allow for a more effective 
means of regulating traffic than is possible by treating all packets 
equally.17 Referred to as the “body scanner for the Internet” 
by the computer scientist Rüdiger Weis (2012), deep packet 
inspection, which is a collective term for a variety of technologies, 
goes far beyond solving the congestion problems of the network. 
At the nodes, that is, where transmissions are interrupted, it 
allows the content of data packets to be inspected at a bit­level of 
accuracy. Instead of relying on headers to identify data packets, it 
enables bit packets to be opened and their so­called “payload” to 
be read and analyzed individually or statistically. The political and 
Internet activist Markus Beckedahl has thus declared deep packet 
inspection to be a “risky technology” that entails, even if sensible 
quality assurances are instituted, the possibility of seamless 
surveillance (see Siering 2011).
In the case of stateful packet inspection, which remains common, 
every data packet is identified and allocated according to its 
17 On the differences between these various processes and on their legal 
foundations, see Bedner (2009). On the advantages and disadvantages of 
using deep packet inspection to manage networks, see Bärwolff (2009).
47header. In the presently used transmission protocol IPv4, the 
header can admittedly be marked with information about the 
importance of a packet, but there are no standards or obligations 
for providers to prioritize these packets (see Beckedahl 2009). 
With the gradual introduction of IPv6, which has been going 
on for a few years (IPv5 was leapfrogged), the classification of 
transport types (but also the encryption of content) that was not 
implemented with IPv4 has become possible. This has facilitated 
the prioritization of individual packets without the use of deep 
packet inspection (see Deutscher Bundestag 2012). However, 
because all of the large providers have meanwhile acquired the 
hardware necessary for deep packet inspection—on account of 
legal provisions to be explained later, providers in the United 
States have even been required to acquire this hardware—and 
because there has been enough incentive to regulate traffic even 
beyond the issue of pure bandwidth management, it would be 
premature to place too much faith in this simple solution.
Every data packet consists of multiple sequential but indepen­
dent logistical layers, the purpose of which is to enable com­
munication between different networks. A data packet has 
several casings, so to speak, each of which bears a different sort 
of information (Figure 1). At a given node, the upper layers have 
to be exposed in order for a packet to be distributed further, 
because these layers contain transportation­oriented data. They 
provide information about the hardware and the header to be 
used for making the connection and transmission, information 
that is required for TCP/IP to operate. Transmissions made by 
means of these protocols have access only to these upper layers. 
The data kept in the lower layers are admittedly present but, 
even without encryption, they cannot readily be accessed during 
the application of the protocol. Depending on the hardware 
and provider being used, however, deep packet inspection also 
allows for the application­oriented layers to be read—from the 
layer containing transmitted information for a given browser 
application, to the layer dealing with the peer­to­peer client, all 
48 the way to that concerned with Skype. To this end, devices are 
equipped with data signatures with which traffic is scanned, clas­
sified, and further processed. Because deep packet inspection 
analyzes all aspects of traffic, the latest hardware must there­
fore be able to perform at a far higher level than conventional 
network technology, which only processes headers. This occurs 
during the brief interruptions when decisions are made about 
the subsequent routes to be taken. With the knowledge gained 
by means of deep packet inspection, it is now possible, within 
the same window of time, to open other layers and to modify 
these decisions accordingly (see Królikowski 2014; Bar­Yanai et 
al. 2010). The conditions have changed to the extent that the new 
technology has infiltrated the time and place of decision­making. 
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A variety of parties happen to be interested in such processes: 
Internet providers use this technology for bandwidth 
49management or for filtering out email spam, fee­based service 
providers use it to measure sales volume, the police use it to 
fight crime, lawyers working for the entertainment industry use 
it to prosecute illegal downloads, and it is valuable to online 
commerce as a means to create personalized advertising. It is 
employed in corporate networks to secure outgoing data and is 
used in a simplified form in firewalls and spam filters, which can 
function without blocking IP or DNS­addresses (see Ingham and 
Forrest 2002). Deep packet inspection has also become a common 
tool employed by intelligence services and can serve as a weapon 
in cyber warfare. In China, Iran, and Turkey, for instance, deep 
packet inspection is applied to analyze online search queries with 
certain keywords as well as to prevent access, at the nodes, to 
websites such as YouTube or Twitter (see Human Rights Watch 
2014). As a branch of the Pentagon, the NSA also makes use of it 
(among other processes) to preselect, at the providers’ nodes, 
that which the agency wishes to save and evaluate in the interest 
of national security (see Bamford 2012). 
One could go so far as to claim that the practices of the NSA 
and other intelligence services would not be possible without 
these technologies, which thus turn out to be rather Janus­faced: 
That which is meant to facilitate the fair distribution of network 
capacity can be used for the sake of surveillance and oppression. 
As a stage of escalation, the processes of deep packet inspection 
can consequently be cited to demonstrate how the debates about 
net neutrality and NSA surveillance, despite all their differences, 
converge at a technical level: The objectives of both sides are 
achieved during the interruptions of transmissions and thus 
depend on the micro­temporality of decisions.
While deep packet inspection, which is technically sophisticated 
and requires large amounts of computing, enables the con­
tents of data packets to be read, statistical or stochastic packet 
inspection enables their patters to be analyzed statistically and 
thus selected and, if appropriate, further processed. Because 
there are methods of encryption to prevent the inspection of 
50 packets (that is, to prevent their contents from being read), 
processes have been developed to block individual ports or 
to identify, by analyzing the patterns of transmitted packets 
and their so­called metadata, various applications in order to 
pinpoint or even block certain peer­to­peer applications that are 
bandwidth­intensive and frequently used for illegal downloads. 
If numerous small packets are being sent at regular intervals, 
this implies the use of VoIP or the continuous use of full peer­to­
peer bandwidth, whereas emails course through the line at an 
irregular rate (see McKelvey 2010; Sietmann 2011; Sandvig 2007). 
Such patterns can accordingly be recognized by big­data analysis, 
which extracts and algorithmically evaluates information directly 
from collected data, and their volumes can be technically limited 
or their causes can be detected. The popularity of these systems 
is also suggested by the fact that, since 2014, standards for 
exchanging data between different types of hardware have been 
established (see International Telecommunication Union 2012). 
For several years, the processes of deep packet inspection 
have been implemented on a hardware­basis by a variety of 
producers. Because of the legal gray area surrounding their 
use, however, it is not easy to obtain more precise information 
about their basic principles. In comparison with the long­avail­
able systems for monitoring the nodes of telephone networks, 
the essential difference lies in the sheer capacity of data that can 
be processed and in the possibility of processing such data with 
graph­based analytic methods. For example, once it is integrated 
into a network node, the flagship model of Cisco’s Service Control 
Engines, the SCE 10000, is able to monitor, track, and manage 
twenty million simultaneous sessions of up to two million con­
current subscribers with a maximum throughput of sixty gigabits 
per second.18 Users do not even notice that this is taking place: 
18 In Russia, where such devices are not commercially available, they can be 
purchased on the black market for approximately $150,000 (see Used Cisco 
Info 2015).
51With this platform, providers can identify content trans­
ported over any protocol, provide detailed analysis and 
control of complex content­based applications, and prioritize 
sessions in real time. . . . With this exclusive, high­perform­
ance, stateful architecture, operators have better capabilities 
for profitably delivering an array of services customized to 
individual subscriber needs. (Cisco Systems 2015) 
Although this advertisement on Cisco’s homepage foregrounds 
the needs of the users whose traffic is to be monitored and 
controlled, the situation came to a head at the legal level: The 
rejected Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), a bill introduced in the 
US House of Representatives in 2011, and the failed international 
Anti­Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), both of which 
succumbed to considerable public pressure, would have forced 
providers to use such hardware to filter search queries for the 
transmission of copyright­protected contents and to collect 
the corresponding IP addresses (see Halpin 2013, 10). Access to 
allegedly illegal websites would thus have been blocked, net neu­
trality would have been broken, and all of this would have been 
legally mandated at the international level.
As Constanze Kurz of the Chaos Computer Club has pointed 
out, it can be presumed that the hardware being used in coun­
tries such as Turkey, China, Syria, or Iran is considerably more 
powerful (see Kurz 2011). Several hundred documents leaked by 
WikiLeaks under the name “Spyfiles,” which consist largely of 
product presentations and operating instructions by Western 
security firms, demonstrate the potential applications that such 
technologies have for governments. In addition to employing 
deep and statistical packet inspection, the possibility of creating 
graphs between generated profiles, which is frequently being 
integrated into devices, allows these technologies to identify 
people and their networks (see Lemke 2008). As one of many 
examples, the system known as Eagle Glint, which is produced 
by the French company Amesys, can monitor approximately four 
terabytes of data and calculate profiles out of this information 
52 (see Sonne and Gauthier­Villars 2012; WikiLeaks 2011). In 2013, five 
Libyan dissidents filed a complaint against the company because 
its technology was used to identify them by Gaddafi’s regime, 
which arrested and tortured them (see Worldwide Human Rights 
Movement 2013). As Dietmar Kammerer has shown, however, a 
legally­binding international ban on exporting surveillance and 
espionage hardware does not exist—not least because Western 
intelligence services have come to rely on these technologies as 
well (2015).
With such hardware, with deep packet inspection, and with the 
mathematical methods of graph theory, it has become quite 
easy to monitor the unencrypted traffic of individual users in a 
selective manner, to identify their friends and connections, and 
even at times to manipulate their access to data. In this regard it 
is not only interesting what someone is communicating but also 
to whom it is being communicated, how long the communication 
lasts, from where it is being sent, and how frequently it occurs. 
Metadata can potentially contain information that is in fact more 
important than the contents of the message—but above all they 
can be analyzed automatically in large quantities, which is not 
the case with contents. They cannot be encrypted but rather, 
at best, they can be concealed by means of something like a 
Tor network, which makes connection data anonymous.19 Even 
encrypted packets, in which the lower layers of the payload are 
inaccessible, can be analyzed by means of statistical or stochastic 
packet inspection. The technologies used for such inspection are 
initiated where connections are produced between people—be 
it by them staying at places that can be localized (by means of 
transmission towers) or by the contacts that they have cultivated 
19 Tor is an acronym for “The Onion Router.” In a network of this sort, which 
was developed by the US Navy, traffic is directed through diverse and inter­
nationally dispersed intermediary stations and is thus difficult to identify. 
The process, however, slows the traffic down, which in turn renders time­
critical services dysfunctional.
53online.20 Surveillance is initiated where these connections are 
produced by means of the interruptions that are needed for 
decisions to be made, namely at the nodes of the network. It 
takes place during the time that these interruptions last.
However, it is not only the terror of such regimes but also the 
efforts of providers to transmit various sorts of traffic at various 
speeds that depend on the big­data analysis of metadata and 
on the possibilities afforded by deep packet inspection: When 
the point has been reached where providers are capable of dis­
tinguishing between data packets with text or video data, it will 
then be sensible to treat the latter with priority. Even if providers 
and intelligence services have different definitions of what “con­
tents” are, they have taken identical paths on the way to reaching 
their respective definitions. As Lawrence Lessig has pointed out 
(2004, 174), it is not yet the case that the need to control data 
transmissions will necessarily result in the establishment of 
secretive or high­profit monopolies over the transmission of data. 
And yet whenever control is necessary, surveillance is possible. 
“Collecting It All”
In terms of network management, control is necessary 
for maintaining traffic, but it also entails the possibility of 
surveillance. Technically speaking, surveillance in digital networks 
is often just a parasite living off of the necessary controls; it is 
something that is freeloading off of neutrality.
The revelations leaked by the whistleblower Edward Snowden, 
who was twenty­nine years old at the time, made it irrefutably 
known to the global public that intelligence services around the 
world are attempting to tap into all data packets, that they are 
20 In 2010, the computer scientist Jens­Martin Loebel began an experimental 
diary in which he recorded all of his GPS data. Even from the data collected 
over the course of a few weeks, Loebel was able to make exact predictions 
about his behavior, that is, about his presence at particular places at 
particular times (2011).
54 doing so with the means described above (among others), and 
that they are doing so with or without any justifiable suspicions 
about terrorist or criminal activity. With evidence from top­secret 
documents it became obvious that big data are now married to a 
misguided security policy to form a dream couple in our society 
of control.21 It is no surprise, then, that one of the slogans used 
by Keith Alexander, a former director of the NSA, was “collecting 
it all” (cited by Greenwald [2014, 79] from an internal NSA mem­
orandum). Consequently, the entire population of the world 
is being held under general suspicion. The technical condition 
behind the NSA’s role is that decisions have to be made about 
every data packet and that, to this end, every one of them has to 
be buffered for a brief moment. The extent of the subsequent 
automated surveillance is an effect of the architecture of digital 
networks. The place of decision­making during the time of inter­
ruption is the main gateways at which the necessary act of con­
trol is placed side­by­side with the act of surveillance. They dwarf 
any of the manual efforts made by the Stasi or other historical 
secret services. To summarize in polemic terms: All conspiracy 
theories are true.
Even if much of what the leaked documents have made public 
has long been known and even if Snowden has sacrificed his life, 
as the IT security expert Sandro Gaycken has remarked, simply 
to reveal the long­presumed evidence of an “open secret” (2013), 
the importance of the findings cannot be stressed enough. 
Across national borders and continents, the documents call 
into question the legitimacy of the institutions involved. While it 
might have been known that the NSA aims to achieve the most 
efficient means of surveillance, the conspicuous presence of the 
logos of companies such as Facebook, Google, or Apple in inter­
nal documents underscores this knowledge. The risk is that the 
uncovered quantity of surveillance will overshadow its political 
21 On Snowden, see Lyon (2014) and the collection of newspaper articles and 
blog entries in Beckedahl and Meister (2014), which explore the social and 
political side of the affair but largely ignore its technological aspects.
55significance, while little will be learned about the technologies 
that have been used. The political dimension of the affair goes 
beyond the unquestionably important debates about privacy 
and beyond reviving the discussion of WikiLeaks as a safe haven 
for whistleblowers (Steinmetz 2012). Of greater concern are the 
disconnections and connections of communication and the 
constitution of the social, which, under the aegis of seamless 
surveillance, has been placed on a new foundation. 
As early as 1982, James Bamford provided extensive descriptions 
of the NSA’s practices in his book The Puzzle Practice, and he 
updated his oberservations in the more recent The Shadow 
Factory (2008). Such practices have similarly been denounced, 
but not irrefutably substantiated, by the whistleblowers Thomas 
Drake and William Binney. Even Friedrich Kittler, following Bam­
ford’s lead in the 1980s, made reference to the NSA’s clandestine 
technology (Kittler 1986/2014). Despite the ambivalent reactions 
to the leaks—some concocted grand conspiracy theories, others 
saw them as a threat to public life22—it was Snowden’s doc­
uments that permanently altered the tableau of activity and our 
trust in the position of everyone involved. Not least, the doc­
uments also clearly exposed the relevance of micro­decisions. 
Boundless surveillance and total transparency, which were 
actively pursued and which for a long time were opposed only by 
practical limitations, have considerably increased the potency of 
decision­making because they perpetuate an imbalance of power 
relations: Whoever invisibly controls things behind the scenes 
also has control over who knows or does not know anything 
about surveillance. And whoever is ignorant of the fact that he or 
she is under suspicion is consequently unable to protest.
Behind the debates spurred by Snowden lies the convergence, 
legally promoted in the United States since the 1970s, of security 
22 Nigel Inkster, the former director of the British Secret Intelligence Service, 
attempted to relativize Snowden’s leaks from the perspective of intelligence 
agencies (2014).
56 and information technologies, which has only escalated since 
the introduction of the Internet. In a speech delivered to the 
Brookings Institution—“Going Dark: Are Technology, Piracy, 
and Public Safety on a Collision Course?”—the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation’s (FBI’s) director James Comey, reacting to 
Snowden’s leaks, openly discussed the difficulties that his col­
leagues have faced in their efforts to keep up with technological 
developments: “We have the legal authority to intercept and 
access communications and information pursuant to court 
order, but we often lack the technical ability to do so” (2014). 
The challenge in fighting crime, he noted, is that of keeping pace 
with the ever­changing pathways of communication, given that 
a suspect might have parallel access to a land­line telephone, 
a mobile phone, instant messaging, and Voice over IP. Comey 
therefore suggested that a public discussion should take place 
regarding the uses and drawbacks of digital encryption. Tellingly, 
he gave his speech shortly after Apple’s announcement that its 
new iPhone models would be equipped with a type of encryption 
that Apple itself, according to the company’s own claims, is 
unable to decode (Apple 2015). No less significant is the fact that 
both Comey and Apple exempt cloud services from the security 
afforded by encryption; state institutions will still have access to 
them for the purpose of preventing crime. It must therefore be 
asked, as Comey stated, whether it would truly be desirable to 
encrypt the vast majority of transmitted communication, given 
that this would immensely impede law enforcement and create 
large costs. Public interest is thus being played off against the 
right to privacy: “Justice may be denied, because of a locked 
phone or an encrypted hard drive” (2014).
The background of the debate initiated by Comey is occupied 
largely by the Communication Assistance for Law Enforcement 
Act (CALEA), which was passed in 1994 during Bill Clinton’s pres­
idency. According to this law, all providers of communication 
services in the United States—companies with the “capability 
for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, 
57retrieving, utilizing or making available information via telecom­
munications” (US Congress 1996)—must embed in their products 
the possibility of monitoring communication for purposes of 
assisting legally sanctioned police investigations. Analogously, 
according to Statute 110 of the German Telecommunications Law 
(Telekommunikationsgesetz), providers are likewise obligated to 
cooperate with law enforcement during criminal prosecutions. 
The objective of the American law is “to make clear a telecom­
munications carrier’s duty to cooperate in the interception of 
communications for law enforcement purposes, and for other 
purposes” (US Congress 1996). That final clause leaves plenty 
of room for interpretation. By means of a few amendments, 
the law covers, in addition to traditional telephone and Inter­
net providers, Voice­over­IP providers as well. Even at the 
level of hardware, they have to modify their services in such a 
surveillance­friendly manner that it is possible for institutions to 
use them for the continuous surveillance of potential criminals, 
provided that a court order has been issued to do so. American 
providers are therefore only permitted to use routers and servers 
that are technically suitable for surveillance. This does not nec­
essarily mean that they are equipped for deep packet inspection 
but that they must include traditional methods for eavesdropping 
(compared to which, however, deep packet inspection represents 
a massive technical simplification). 
It became known as early as 2007 that the FBI, using a system 
called the Digital Collection System Network (DCSNet) and 
with full support of the law, has been able to monitor, com­
prehensively, the telephonic communication of potential 
criminals at the nodes of telecommunications providers. In doing 
so, however, the Bureau is only able to register connections and 
metadata; it cannot inspect the contents of communication (see 
Singel 2007). In 2010, a proposed amendment to the law was 
overturned that would have forced Internet companies such as 
Facebook or Google to integrate the possibility of institutional 
surveillance into their instant­messaging services—even if it was 
58 later exposed that these companies, too, share their data with 
the NSA (see Savage 2013).
In sum, this means that both hardware and software have to be 
equipped to enable surveillance. Yet, as Comey stressed, the FBI 
can hardly keep up with the speed of technological innovation. 
On account of encryption, the agency is finding itself in an 
increasingly awkward situation, and this is also the case because 
providers are not always willing to cooperate in a satisfactory 
manner: “I want people to understand that law enforcement 
needs to be able to access communications and information to 
bring people to justice” (2014). In Comey’s estimation, security 
and privacy, which some providers would like to guarantee 
for their customers, are a hindrance to law enforcement, and 
encryption can only be justified if there also happens to be a back 
door for “lawful interceptions” by the FBI. It is never mentioned 
that this back door might also be of service to certain interested 
parties that are somewhat less virtuous. A few days after Comey’s 
speech, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), which fights to 
protect civil liberties in the digital age and is also an active par­
ticipant in the debates about net neutrality, issued a response in 
which it claimed that the FBI should be trying to safeguard the 
security of everyone instead of encouraging providers to offer 
less security to their customers (C. Cohn 2014).
With the goal of securely verifying online transactions, the US 
government attempted as early as 1993 to introduce a hard­
ware­based standard encryption for all networked devices. 
This encryption also would have allowed those involved in a 
given transaction to be identified unambivalently.23 Encryption 
notwithstanding, the algorithm known as Skipjack, which was 
to be used by the Clapston and Clipper chips installed in all 
23 On the debates over encryption and decryption in the United States during 
the mid­1990s (the so­called Crypto Wars), see Engemann (2015). Regarding 
the history of encryption and its conflict with the state, see Diffie and 
Landau (2010).
59network­compatible devices, would have nevertheless provided 
the government with a steady opportunity to monitor the 
exchange of data. The promise was more or less this: We will 
provide you with security if you provide us, and only us, with 
access to your privacy. It was intended for the key to all encrypted 
devices to be kept not only by the user but also in a government 
database, where retrieval was only possible by court order. 
These efforts ultimately failed on account of public pressure 
and protests from companies worrying about foreign markets. 
It was methods such as these, however, that the NSA revived 
without any legal basis but simply as a component of the War on 
Terror. Comey has reheated this debate from the 1980s and has 
made it clear just how little the government’s skeptical position 
on encryption has changed. He has also revealed, however, the 
immense measures that the FBI alone has since taken to enable 
decryption and surveillance.
There is more to this discussion than the mere desire to create 
better working conditions for investigators. The CALEA law 
also implies that a provider is not responsible for decoding 
an encryption applied by a user. This task is reserved for the 
law enforcement authorities. In fact, Comey’s argumentation 
suggests that in the future providers should be forced, with the 
help of deep packet inspection, to avoid processing encrypted 
traffic at all. Encryption, according to this argument, should 
simply be prohibited outright in order to inhibit those who have 
something to hide. 
Even beyond the economic disadvantages that American 
providers have already faced upon the introduction of the 
law, the weak points of Comey’s argumentation are obvious: 
He is silent, for instance, about how the FBI should go about 
protecting its own data exchanges. To demand that a technical 
threshold be put in place that fundamentally prohibits encryption 
seems both naïve and dangerous for all who, with good reason, 
want to protect their online traffic—from bankers to human 
rights activists to police officers themselves. Instead, Comey’s 
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safeguard his or her privacy from the NSA and data­hungry 
companies—and not simply to conceal crimes—is implicitly in 
favor of obstructing justice. It does not seem unrealistic to sup­
pose that the next step would be to make any opposition to the 
NSA or the FBI illegal—and to make it illegal, too, to discuss their 
activities in public.
Even though the FBI and the NSA cannot be treated as a 
single entity, Comey’s argumentation has made it clear how 
extensively the issue of net neutrality has been scrutinized by 
government agencies. His remarks perfectly complement the 
practices of the NSA, which for many years did not feel sub­
jected to the limitations imposed on the FBI. Unlike that of the 
FBI, however, the NSA’s goal is simply to collect, independent 
of any legal authority, all available data in order to fight global 
terrorism. There have been indications, however, that it is 
also engaged in industrial espionage and politically motivated 
acts of eavesdropping. In contrast to the FBI, the intelligence 
services determine on their own who is or who is not an enemy 
of the state. The main problem faced by the NSA, however, is 
not encryption but rather the difficulty of storing vast amounts 
of information in light of the so­called three Vs of big data— 
“volume, velocity, and variety” (Bamford 2008, 331). In his first 
interview with the journalists Laura Poitras, Glenn Greenwald, 
and Ewen MacAskill, which took place in June of 2013, Edward 
Snowden made the following remarks: “It ingests them by default. 
It collects them in its system and it filters them and it analyzes 
them and it measures them and it stores them for periods of time 
simply because that is the easiest, most efficient, and most val­
uable way to achieve these ends” (Greenwald et al. 2013).
A few days before this interview, in which Snowden, who before 
going into hiding had been an infrastructure analyst for the 
defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton, identified himself as a 
whistleblower, the British newspaper The Guardian published the 
first document from a batch of more than two hundred thousand: 
61a secret order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. 
The latter was established in the 1970s in response to the illegal 
monitoring of human rights activists and pacifists; its task is to 
review requests for surveillance warrants, and it later became an 
extension of the NSA.24 As of 2012, the court had received more 
than twenty thousand requests for such warrants, of which it 
rejected only eleven (Greenwald 2014, 95). In the first leaked doc­
ument, the provider Verizon is issued the following order, which 
appears somewhat ironically under the header “TOP SECRET//SI//
NOFORN” (for Special Intelligence, No Foreign Nationals): 
It is hereby ordered that, the Custodian of Records shall 
produce to the National Security Agency (NSA) upon service 
of this Order, and continue production on an ongoing 
daily basis thereafter for the duration of this Order, unless 
otherwise ordered by the Court, an electronic copy of the 
following tangible things: all call detail records or ‘telephony 
metadata’ created by Verizon for communications (i) 
between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within 
the United States, including local telephone calls. . . . It is 
further ordered that no person shall disclose to any other 
person that the FBI or NSA has sought or obtained tangible 
things under this Order . . . (quoted from Guardian 2013) 
The bottom line of the document states the date of declas­
sification: April 12, 2038. The only way to protest against a secret 
order such as this is to do so before a secret court.25 There is, in 
other words, no way to protest at all.
The way that the revelations unfolded was staged according to a 
tightly orchestrated strategy: One day after this document had 
informed the global public that the largest Internet provider in 
24 The aftermath of the Snowden revelations will only be given marginal 
attention here. For a comprehensive treatment of the affair, see Landau 
(2013; 2014). On Snowden’s role as a whistleblower, see Scheuerman (2014).
25 The new role of secrecy in digital cultures has been described by Timon 
Beyes and Claus Pias (2014).
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to the NSA, what followed was the release of a strikingly low­
quality internal PowerPoint presentation meant to train people 
on how to use the espionage program Planning Tool for Resource 
Integration, Synchronization, and Management (PRISM). Within 
this presentation, Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, 
YouTube, Skype, AOL, and Apple are mentioned as providers 
whose server data are routinely collected. As the slides indicate, 
the NSA has access to all the processes conducted on these 
platforms, to all the content saved there, and to Voice­over­IP 
conversations (see Electronic Frontier Foundation 2013). The 
leaks released shortly thereafter concerned the software XKeys­
core, which allows the Internet traffic of a targeted person to 
be monitored live. Going beyond the scope of CALEA, it forces 
providers to share with the NSA the data that they have collected 
about all of their users, not simply their data about suspected 
criminals. In an interview on German television, Snowden 
described the capabilities of the program as follows: 
You could read anyone’s email in the world, anybody you’ve 
got an email address for. Any website: You can watch traffic 
to and from it. Any computer that an individual sits at: You 
can watch it. Any laptop that you’re tracking: you can follow 
it as it moves from place to place throughout the world. 
It ’s a one­stop­shop for access to the NSA’s information. 
(Mestmacher­Steiner 2014)
More and more new documents were brought to light in the 
subsequent weeks, and they evidenced the extent to which 
surveillance and espionage are being conducted not only by the 
NSA but also by the British intelligence agency GCHQ (espe­
cially by means of its Tempora computer program) and by the 
intelligence services of nearly every Western industrialized 
nation. They demonstrated, in other words, the dissolution 
of privacy in digital networks. In an effort to downplay this 
leaked information, the NSA issued a statement claiming that it 
monitored just 1.6 percent of the 1,826 petabytes transmitted on 
63a daily basis, mostly by collecting the twenty­nine petabytes sent 
via undersea cables. Of this data, supposedly only 0.025 percent 
is subjected to further processing, which would constitute merely 
0.00004 percent of global data transmissions (National Security 
Agency 2013). If, however, all of the peer­to­peer services and 
video­streaming are weeded out from the total of worldwide 
traffic, 1.6 percent of the rest is anything but insignificant. If the 
storage process is further refined, if repeatedly visited sites are 
not repeatedly saved, and if images are ignored, then it would 
not be outlandish to suppose that this 1.6 percent of total traffic 
is enough to intercept every single email that is sent on a given 
day.26 The NSA’s program known as MonsterMind, which Snowden 
discussed in an interview with James Bamford, is being designed 
to identify and kill any suspected foreign cyber­attacks, such as 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, upon their arrival in 
the United States (Bamford 2014).
Nothing has yet to be leaked regarding the treatment of 
metadata, though sources such as the Wall Street Journal have 
reported that seventy­five percent of the metadata of all traffic 
in the United States and even eighty percent of all telephone 
conversations is being monitored (see Gorman and Valentino­
DeVries 2013; Loewenstein 2014). Regarding mobile phones 
alone, the documents from Snowden’s archive have revealed that 
five billion data records from several hundred million devices 
are being collected daily, on the basis of which conclusions can 
be drawn about the locations of their users (see Gellman and 
Soltani 2013). Thus it is no surprise that the NSA has been able, 
in the case of every suspect, to monitor up to three degrees of 
26 In a legal testimony, the computer scientist Edward W. Felten made the 
following estimations: “Assuming that there are approximately 3 billion calls 
made every day in the United States, and also assuming conservatively that 
each call record takes approximately 50 bytes to store, the mass call tracking 
program generates approximately 140 gigabytes of data every day, or about 
50 terabytes of data each year.” This much data can be saved on a handful 
of spare hard drives. Felten’s calculations also apply to the court order, 
mentioned above, that was issued to Verizon (2013).
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agency will identify not only these people but also the thousands 
of their potential contacts as well. Even if, in the future, this is to 
be reduced to two degrees of separation, the number of people 
under surveillance will remain massive (see Bauman et al. 2014, 
125).
It is a matter of dispute to what extent the NSA’s “secret systems 
of suspicionless surveillance,” as the journalist Glenn Green­
wald has called them, have been successful (2014, 8). Although 
it is unclear precisely how these systems function, it is just as 
unclear to what extent they have continued to be implemented 
despite the onslaught of public criticism and despite the recent 
UN resolution, promoted in large part by Germany and Brazil, 
that identifies the protection of privacy as a basic principle of 
democracy (see Human Rights Council 2014).27 It is clear, however, 
that the capabilities of these systems depend on the fact that all 
traffic has to pass through nodes, where it can be intercepted. 
The sheer amount of data and the problem of storing it may have 
impeded the thirty thousand internal and sixty thousand external 
employees of the NSA from accessing desired information about 
terrorist activities, but the efforts employed to this end were 
systematic and deliberate violations of civil liberties and inter­
national law (on the numbers cited here, see Greenwald 2014, 76). 
Although the surveillance conducted by the NSA was allegedly 
restricted to foreigners, this seems highly unlikely in light of the 
global network of data streams. In this regard, the NSA’s most 
urgent need is thus not for more powerful surveillance tools but 
rather simply for greater storage capacity. This latter need will 
reportedly be fulfilled by the new Mission Data Repository, a 
gigantic facility in Utah designed to store up to twelve exabytes of 
27 For the NSA report on this topic, which was commissioned by the American 
government, see Clarke et al. (2014).
65information.28 If we believe the numbers provided by journalists, 
there would be around two gigabytes for every person on earth.
Edward Snowden’s revelations have raised many other issues 
that can only be touched upon here. They concern the self­
perception of everyone who uses the Internet as a democratic 
citizen. They oscillate between the colonization of privacy and 
the new significance of the press. It is telling that Snowden’s 
first anonymous message to Greenwald consisted of a request 
for him to use Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) encryption for his email 
exchanges, without which Snowden would not have been willing 
to send him any secret documents. This request, which Green­
wald waited a month to satisfy, almost put an end to Snowden’s 
whistleblowing before it began.29
The debate to be held about these open questions and long­
neglected challenges should consider that the relation of the 
state to its citizens has changed dramatically since the arrival 
of the Internet (in conjunction with the “War on Terror”). Not 
only are citizens more transparent to the state but also, on 
account of WikiLeaks and whistleblowers like Snowden, the state 
is now to some extent more transparent to its people. In any 
case, it remains questionable to what extent this new relation is 
compatible with the classical models of political science.30
28 Twelve exabytes correspond to twelve thousand petabytes, twelve million 
terabytes, or twelve billion gigabytes. Four hundred terabytes is enough 
to save all of the books that have ever been written, while three hundred 
petabytes would suffice to store all the American telephone conversations 
that have taken place in a given year (see Hill 2013).
29 See Greenwald (2014, 10). For a thorough introduction to setting up PGP and 
for additional information about encryption, see http://ssd.eff.org/. 
30 In his book on the NSA, Bernhard H. F. Taureck has described this situ­
ation as a “democracy of surveillance,” because the NSA has increasingly 
come to take over the role of religion in the post­secular age. His essay 
demonstrates how certain constitutional and political­theoretical shifts 
in the structure of power have resulted in what he calls a “monitorcracy” 
(Monitorkratie). Its function is based on the fact that the knowledge held 
by intelligence services exceeds that of humanity “by a hundredfold” 
(2014, 10). It remains unclear where these numbers are from and whether 
66 In a co­authored article titled “After Snowden: Rethinking 
the Impact of Surveillance,” a group of political scientists and 
sociologists have discussed the leaks’ significance to sociology 
and have pointed out the difficulties involved with formulating a 
new theoretical framework: 
Most perplexingly, perhaps, we seem to be engaging with 
phenomena that are organized neither horizontally, in 
the manner of an internationalized array of more or less 
self­determining and territorialized states, nor vertically in 
the manner of a hierarchy of higher and lower authorities. 
Relations, lines of flight, networks, integrations and dis­
integrations, spatiotemporal contractions and accelerations, 
simultaneities, reversals of internality and externality, 
increasingly elusive boundaries between inclusion and 
exclusion, or legitimacy and illegitimacy: the increasing 
familiarity of these, and other similar notions, suggests a 
powerful need for new conceptual and analytical resources. 
(Bauman et al. 2014, 124).
The authors of this article have consciously sidestepped the 
current narratives of big­brother surveillance, which simply 
presume that new technologies serve to enable more precise 
surveillance. They have focused instead on the social process in 
which intelligence services have become independent political 
actors that set their own goals. What we are facing regarding 
the transformation of secret­service practices has thus become 
evident: There will be new interrelations that transcend national 
humanity’s knowledge—by which he presumably means the stored amount 
of all written texts—can even be sensibly compared with the information 
collected by the NSA. It rather seems as though a categorical error has been 
made, as a consequence of which Taureck fails to discuss the incursion of 
the digital and all of its effects. His argumentation, however in tune it might 
be with the current political situation, does not pertain to any of the specific 
practices of the NSA and neglects to distinguish, for instance, between data 
and metadata. Thus it is perhaps not surprising that he also never mentions 
encryption as a potential counter­strategy.
67boundaries and in which certain roles have been redefined; 
partners will simultaneously act both for and against one 
another’s ambitions; and problems concerning national juris­
diction will arise if, for instance, the German Federal Intelligence 
Service requests data from the NSA that it is not legally permitted 
to collect on its own, and vice versa, while at the same time 
it comes to light that the NSA has been instrumentalizing its 
ostensible partners. Big data will not be stopped by national 
borders. 
All of this has culminated, first, in a shift from “a high degree 
of certainty about a small amount of data to a high degree 
of uncertainty about a large amount of data” (Bauman et al. 
2014, 125); second, in an act of collaboration—by means of 
the global propensity for people to share private information 
online—between those under surveillance and those con­
ducting it; and, third, in the forms of subjectivity created by such 
activity, according to which everyone has become a suspect and 
social relations have been commodified. At the same time as 
intelligence services were gaining independence, the new relation 
between surveillance and privacy altered the sphere in which 
subjects develop. Their relations to other subjects have become 
valuable, marketable, and processable. Regimes of surveillance 
are thus accompanied by new manners of subjectivation (Sub-
jektivierungsweisen), which are also subject to micro­decisions. 
The End of the Internet
After Snowden, the Internet is no longer supposed to be what 
it once was. Yet this future is also being threatened by another 
side—or was rather always under threat. The third reason behind 
the intensity of the present debates is the fear that the World 
Wide Web could come to an end (see Riley and Scott 2009). To 
put it bluntly, if the abolishment of net neutrality becomes the 
norm, future portions of the previously freely accessible Internet 
will no longer be accessible to the users of certain providers. In 
68 structural terms—to be blunt again—this would hardly be any 
different from the situation in China, where Google or YouTube 
are being blocked with the technical methods discussed above. 
The danger is thus that the Internet would no longer be identical 
for every user, because each user would be dependent on his or 
her contract, on the practices of the provider in question, or on 
government regulations and therefore only be able to accomplish 
certain goals. In the urgent words of Tim Berners­Lee: “If we, the 
Web’s users, allow these and other trends to proceed unchecked, 
the Web could be broken into fragmented islands. We could 
lose the freedom to connect with whichever Web sites we want” 
(quoted from Whitney 2010).
In this light especially, Snowden’s revelations gain even greater 
significance. The act of eavesdropping on land­line telephone 
conversations during the Cold War or the age­old technique 
of intelligence services opening letters did not jeopardize 
or cast doubt on these communications media (on tele­
phone surveillance, see Rieger 2008). Yet the scope of online 
surveillance, in light of the fact that nearly all paths of com­
munication run through servers and routers, casts doubt on the 
architecture of the Internet itself—or, as activist Sascha Lobo has 
put it: “The Internet is kaputt” (2014). Lobo admittedly presup­
poses that a healthy Internet must necessarily be free, neutral, 
and open. The question remains, however, of how the opposite of 
a non­neutral, monitored, and closed Internet could or should be 
modeled. 
In November of 2014, the White House released a YouTube video 
with a short speech by Barack Obama in which he acknowledged, 
with greater clarity than ever before, the issue of net neu­
trality. Here he insisted that the FCC, an independent authority 
established in 1934 to regulate all transmissions of information, 
should establish rules to protect the unconditional neutrality of 
all data packets and should not impede the democratic and eco­
nomic function of the “vibrant ecosystem of digital devices, apps, 
and platforms that fuel growth and expand opportunity.” He went 
69on to say, “As long as I am president, that is what I am fighting 
for” (White House 2014). The impetus behind Obama’s plea was 
a decision reached in 2005 to treat providers as “information 
services,” which are subject to fewer potential regulations, and 
not as “telecommunications services.” Obama pointed out that 
this definition is obsolete and that providers should henceforth 
be understood as providers of telecommunications services that 
fulfill important functions in society and should thus be subject 
to greater scrutiny. According to the position held by Tim Wu, this 
means that telecommunication should be treated as a common 
good that serves the welfare of society and therefore should not 
be subordinated to private interests (see Scola 2014).
However noteworthy and important Obama’s statements might 
be, given that they were the first comments to be issued by a 
government in favor of unconditional neutrality, they indicate all 
the more how important it is to think about net neutrality and 
surveillance in an integrated manner. For, however unconditional 
it might seem, the neutrality being promoted by the winner of 
the Nobel Peace Prize can, for simple legal reasons, not exist: 
Surveillance for purposes of law enforcement—and thus the use 
of hardware for purposes of network management—is codified 
in the law and more or less impervious to any debate. Under 
Obama’s leadership, in fact, the authority of the NSA has been 
extended even further. Every single data record can fall under the 
NSA’s control because decisions have to be made about their dis­
semination. To this end, every transmission has to be interrupted. 
This window of time is the habitat of the NSA; or, as Friedrich Kit­
tler so perspicaciously remarked in 1986: “The NSA as the collapse 
of strategy and technology would be information itself” (Kittler 
1986/2014). After Snowden, net neutrality can no longer be dis­
cussed in the same terms as it had been prior to his revelations. 
Only a few days after Obama’s statement, Republicans in the 
US Senate rejected a bill, known as the USA Freedom Act, that 
would have brought about large reforms to the NSA. Proposed 
by the Democratic government, this bill also enjoyed massive 
70 support from providers of digital services (see Ackerman 2014). 
The law would have limited the mass surveillance of metadata 
and greatly restricted the capacities of programs such as PRISM. 
Under the new provision, data would have admittedly continued 
to be collected by providers for a period of eighteen months, but 
the NSA only would have had access to this information if it were 
demonstrably useful for shedding light on or preventing acts 
of terrorism. And on December 4, 2014—only a few days after 
this vote had taken place—German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
announced at the Digitising Europe Summit that her government 
would support the establishment of a dual­class Internet. An 
Internet conducive to innovation, she said, “would be one in 
which there is a particular degree of security for special services. 
… Therefore we need both: the free Internet and one with greater 
quality assurance for special services” (Merkel 2014). A free 
Internet, however, cannot be cut in half. Obama’s speech, to the 
contrary, fulfilled its promise: In February of 2015, the FCC ruled 
in favor of net neutrality and released a set of constrictions for 
Internet service providers.
On account of the three reasons outlined above—increasing 
traffic volume, the possibilities of deep packet inspection, and 
the threatening inaccessibility of certain portions of the Inter­
net—it has become clear that the debates over net neutrality 
and surveillance have been concerned with some of the greatest 
challenges being faced by today’s digital cultures. All three of 
these reasons revolve around the role of micro­decisions. In 
order to understand what is at stake with them, at which times 
and places they are made, and how they can be used to promote 
certain interests, it will be necessary to delve more deeply 
into the technical architecture of data transmission. Or, as the 
computer scientist Agata Królikowski has noted: “The difference 
between observing and intervening, between blocking or 
delaying information and letting it pass through, simply comes 
down to a technical rule defined in the software, a rule that can 
be changed at any time” (2014, 158).
71In order to introduce a different perspective, one that will serve 
as an apt transition to the next chapter, I would like to add that all 
of this can ultimately be reformulated in media­theoretical terms: 
The end­to­end principle potentially liberates communication and 
transmitted messages from surveillance by integrating interrup­
tions into transmissions. During these interruptions, packets are 
admittedly processed before being forwarded, but this is done 
by means of a protocol for which the contents of the packets play 
no role at all. Transmissions do not follow any direct connection 
from A to B; rather, they are conveyed across  a series of nodes 
and there are thus multiple possible connections. Because of 
this, these interruptions open up a timeframe for control. They 
are ambivalent to the extent that, while they admittedly serve 
to facilitate the unimpeded transportation of data, at the same 
time they represent the technical starting point for monitoring 
the traffic itself. From this perspective, net neutrality leads to a 
sort of unimpeded communication that can only be unimpeded 
to the extent that is stopped at every node of the network. Inter­
ruptions are inscribed into this sort of transmission. Between 
senders and receivers there are acts of interception. As my 
reading of Baran’s network theory will show, it is precisely this 
point—describable as it is with the concepts of Claude Shannon’s 
theory of communication—at which the significance and potential 
of communicating on digital networks can be negotiated beyond 
the implementation of micro­decisions. It is at this point, too, 
where the scope or dimension of micro­decisions is obscured by 
the phantasm of immediate, instantaneous transmission, a sort 
of transmission that allegedly requires no time and has always 
been determined in advance.

Flows Don’t Burst: 
Packet Switching and 
the Instantaneity of 
Transmission
Although the extent of its influence has been a matter of debate, 
Paul Baran’s 1964 article “On Distributed Communications 
Networks” can certainly be ranked among the central works of 
network theory to anticipate the development of the Internet. It 
was Baran’s model of network architecture that gave rise to the 
structure of power in which micro­decisions are made on the 
basis of protocols. These technical conditions were accompanied 
by a new kind of network politics that has persisted to the 
present day. Thus was enabled the transition from targeted 
eavesdropping on individual connections to the diffuse surveil­
lance of all connections, something which distinguishes the NSA’s 
practices from those of earlier intelligence services. Equipped 
with the technical conditions for neutral transmissions that are 
based on decisions made at a network’s nodes, Baran’s model 
also contains the possibility of undoing this very neutrality. 
The networks constructed later and the Internet itself admittedly 
differ in certain regards from Baran’s machines, which only 
existed on paper. Instead of being distributed, his machines are 
scale­free; their individual nodes function as so­called hubs and 
74 they are able to process a vast number of connections.31 It was 
not until the 1970s that some of Baran’s ideas were adopted, in 
a roundabout way, to inform the construction of the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) after the military 
and the telephone company AT&T had finally relented to make 
the transition from analog to digital transmission (see Brand 
2003). Nevertheless, his text presented a novel approach to 
the technical aspects of time­critical transmission and to the 
micro­temporal synchronizations of information on networks.32 
It demonstrates with the utmost clarity that the success of 
networks necessarily depends on the micro­decisions that take 
place during the course of a transmission. Baran located these 
micro­decisions in the middle of the transmission process and 
also provided instructions as to how they are to be made. His 
model thus makes it possible to study the extent to which a given 
network theory of communication can be exposed to certain 
stipulations, economies, and contradictions. It also makes it 
possible to identify the theoretical and historical obstacles that 
have to be bypassed before anything can be implemented on 
a technical basis. Such obstacles are primarily time­critical in 
nature; they are theoretical and technical difficulties concerned 
with the proper times and micro­temporalities of networks and 
with the traditional desire to overcome temporal limitations—the 
desire, that is, for immediate transmission.
The paradoxical friction of transmissions being both limited 
by time and timeless is condensed into two metaphors: “burs­
ting” and “flowing.” The ideal operation of an electronic 
communications network is based on an uninterrupted, 
31 See Barabási and Bonabeau (2003). In a discussion of scale­free networks 
in which many nodes have just a few connections while a few nodes have a 
great many, such as Internet sites like Facebook or Twitter, Martin Warnke 
(2013) has shown how the participation of all Web 2.0 users is subject to the 
terms and conditions of these large providers.
32 In various publications, Wolfgang Ernst has presented similar arguments 
about process­based and time­critical media. In his work, however, he 
seldom veers from theory to discuss specific technologies (see Ernst 2007).
75continuous, and reliable flow of transmission. However, these 
transmissions can also be described as “bursts of information” 
(Abbate 2000, 19), as packet deliveries that, along their way, 
are constantly interrupted and lose time at every node. Such 
metaphors should not be confused with the technical details of 
frequencies and oscillations in cables or waves. They are rather 
part of a historical dynamic that, as I would like to show, arose 
out of the eighteenth­century sciences concerned with electricity 
and resurfaced anew in Baran’s model. The following discussion 
is an attempt to understand the two modes of bursting and 
flowing as an articulation of a historically established approach 
to the temporal dimension of technical media. With respect to 
their politics, these two modes have opposing consequences, and 
therein lies their great significance to our perspective on today’s 
networks: If everything were to be immediately connected 
to everything else, our potential courses of action would 
radically change—and certainly not in our favor. For if imme­
diate communication were the case, all decisions would already 
be made in advance, there would be neither a time nor a place 
for interruptions, and thus there would be no way to change 
communication itself.
The argument offered in this chapter will thus be made on two 
different levels. On the one hand, I will investigate the technicity 
of Baran’s model as regards its temporality and transmission 
capacity; on the other hand, I will relate all of this to the history 
of immediacy as it historically emerged from electricity research 
and reemerged in Baran’s text. In seeking to combine—in a 
register that is quite different from that of the previous chapter—
perspectives on engineering, technology, communication, 
and the history of science, I hope to delineate the underlying 
assumptions that have been made about temporality in these 
contexts. These assumptions will ultimately prove to be fun­
damental to network politics, to the critique of such politics, and 
to our conception of media. It is in the matter of temporality 
that the significance of micro­decisions is most clear—as is the 
76 danger, however, that they will become hidden and invisible. My 
aim is to underscore what Jacques Derrida has called “coherence 
in contradiction,” which “expresses the force of a desire” (2001, 
352). In this case, the coherence of the contradiction between 
bursting and flowing is accompanied by the history of media. It is 
deeply embedded in the technological condition of the present. 
Such “coherence in contradiction” should not be thought of as a 
solution, for it is neither true nor false. It exerts, however, a sort 
of subliminal influence over the economy of Baran’s text and its 
political imaginary. To follow these tracks means to pursue the 
phantasmatic dimension of technical media and their cultural 
influence. 
In this sense, the following reflections can also be understood 
as approaches toward an archaeology of present­day technical 
infrastructures. They are meant to complement the present­
oriented perspectives of the previous chapter (on media archae­
ology in general, see Parikka 2012). Infrastructures are not simply 
tools or means of production. They are political because at their 
level micro­decisions are made about who can communicate 
and who cannot, what can be transmitted and what cannot, 
who is connected and who is kept apart. We should not simply 
leave these questions to engineers or even to politicians (whose 
judgment is based on the expertise of engineers). Perhaps, to 
some extent, we ourselves should become engineers or at least 
read what they have written and take apart what they have built.
In this respect, Baran treats the relations that people create 
through networks as neutral relations that are subjected to tech­
nical processes. Who is connected with whom is, in his work, an 
insignificant issue, and the question of what it means to hinder 
social relations is never raised (this is surely because Baran’s 
network was intended for government facilities and universities, 
where those who wished to communicate would have known 
each other in any case). It is of decisive importance, however, that 
the connections within the network were temporarily created 
for every transmission. Rather than being necessary, they were 
77accidental. That means that the sociality potentially created 
through these connections has to be addressed on a new level. 
It cannot simply be superimposed by existing social relations but 
calls for the emergence of new relations. 
Baran seeks a technical solution for a technical problem. 
Today, we see that both the problem and the solution cannot 
be separated from the social. Yet, as this technical network has 
spread to potentially every person on the planet, it has come to 
overlap with the social networks in which connections already 
exist and are perhaps necessary for maintaining the network 
itself. If technical and social networks converge—if, that is, tech­
nical possibilities of connecting come to overtake existing social 
connections, and new social connections are created by means 
of technical connections, as we are able to observe all around 
us today—then, unlike the situation in Baran’s time, it will hardly 
still be possible to think about social relations in the absence of 
technical networks of communication. What had long been self­
evident in the case of the postal system or the telephone gains a 
new dimension in light of the temporality, spatiality, and global 
availability of the Internet, a dimension whose political challenges 
should have been clear. Thus the first part of this essay had to be 
written in order to demonstrate here, in the second part, that the 
technical neutrality of the Internet—and the need to control dis­
tributions as well—depends first and foremost on something that 
is no longer possible today, namely the exclusion of the social. In 
this sense, thinking about the technical dimension of new media, 
even on the paths laid out by Friedrich Kittler (who preferred iso­
lated PCs), necessarily implies thinking about the relations they 
create. This relational layer of sociality is based on the technicity 
of micro­decisions. 
Threats of Destruction
The text under discussion is an abridged version of twelve 
longer works that Baran, an immigrant from Poland, had been 
78 contracted to write at the beginning of the 1960s by the RAND 
Corporation. His project in this matter was thus financed 
indirectly by the US Air Force. In his work for this think tank, 
which played a large role in the Cold War, Baran’s task was to 
investigate how a communications network might be able to 
survive a nuclear attack and which forms of connectivity would 
be reasonable for the structure of this network to remain 
operational in the face of the most threatening of all threats.33 
That this network would one day be able to encompass the 
entire world—including Russia—was surely unthinkable at 
the time. When conducting this sort of work, it was typical to 
simulate war scenarios with the latest knowledge and tech­
nology. In addition to the military, Baran’s paper for RAND also 
lists other parties interested in distributed networks: “[t]hose 
concerned with ‘artificial intelligence,’ . . . [t]hose concerned with 
communications within organisms and organizations, . . . [m]
athematicians working with optimization of flow in networks, 
. . . [m]athematicians using dynamic programming to optimize 
incompletely understood and changing systems, . . . [and] [t]
hose concerned with civilian common carrier telephone plant 
switching” (Baran 1964c, 2). It was for the same sort of specialists 
that Donald Davies would later orient the theoretical principles of 
the process known as packet switching.34 The latter is a method 
for transmitting digitally coded data that divides such data into 
individual packets and transports them from one computer to 
another without there needing to be a direct connection between 
the packets. Through a network of multiple nodes, each of equal 
standing, every packet is sent along its own individual path and 
33 In this case, “operational” meant that the system would be able to issue a 
command for a counterstrike.
34 Without any knowledge of Baran’s work, Davies developed a similar process 
while working at the British National Physical Laboratory (see Davies 2001). 
Baran’s model is not unique, but in its consideration of epistemological 
questions it is an especially revealing example of a development that was 
being made in various contexts at the time.
79reassembled at the destination. At every node, a decision is made 
about which path a given packet will take next.
[Figure 2] Network Diagrams (Source: Baran 1964d, 1)
Baran distinguished three types of networks, the diagrams of 
which have become somewhat iconic in the Internet age: cen­
tralized, decentralized, and distributed (Figure 2). Centralized 
and decentralized networks are especially vulnerable because of 
their concentration on certain nodes at which all of the channels 
converge. As an alternative, Baran proposed a topology of dis­
tributed networks. Their essential feature is the “redundancy 
level” of their connections. It increases in conjunction with the 
digital coding of data because the packets can be reproduced 
at will. A centralized network, according to Baran, could be 
disabled with a simple strike against its central node, whereas 
a distributed network, with as many equal nodes as possible 
and just as many or more non­hierarchical connections, is 
nearly impossible to eliminate. For today’s scale­free networks, 
however, it is the case that the removal of a few major hubs 
could cause considerable damage (see Barabási and Bonabeau 
2003). Distributed networks nonetheless represent a solution 
by expanding and multiplying the potential targets of an attack 
on communications infrastructure. This network model requires 
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level, namely as constant interruptions that take place at every 
node and yet ultimately leave the impression that communication 
is based on direct connections. 
Below I will concentrate neither on the developmental stages of 
this communications network, whose practical manifestations 
such as ARPANET and the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA), then directed by Ivan Sutherland, may or may 
not have been influenced much by Baran’s work, nor on the 
social or political conditions in the 1960s that paved the way for 
distributed communications networks. As a number of studies 
have shown, Baran’s text is steeped in the anxieties and political 
pressures of his time—anxieties and pressures for which applied 
scientists were hired to seek technical solutions.35 The concept 
was neither patented nor kept secret in a deliberate attempt to 
provide the Soviet Union with the ability to construct a similarly 
secure communications network of its own. In the paradoxical 
logic of mutual assured destruction (MAD) the USSR’s equally 
secure system would have meant greater security for the United 
States. Like so many theories of the time, Baran’s approach was 
based on the threat of total annihilation and is thus characterized 
by an underlying apocalyptic tone—by an effort to confront the 
worst­case scenario. In order to destroy a distributed network, 
the enemy would have to strike at full capacity and eliminate n of 
n nodes (Figure 3). If only one node were disabled, there would 
still be a sufficient number of connections between all of the 
others. It is clear that such a design was motivated by the logic of 
escalation, according to which a series of nuclear attacks could 
potentially eliminate all of life on earth.
35 Peter Galison (2001) located the origin of this approach to networks in the 
operations research conducted by the Strategic Bombing Survey during 
the Second World War. He also described how this sort of knowledge was 
related to the shift of perspective from being one of the bombers to one of 
the potentially bombed. Christoph Engemann has more recently discussed 
these technical processes as a strategy for survival (Engemann 2010; see also 
Schröter 2004, 43; Gießmann 2009).
81
[Figure 3] Node Destruction (Source: Baran 1964d, 2)
If this text is read in light of the context in which it was written, 
namely at one of most prominent think tanks during the Cold 
War, and if it is read as an attempt to prevent a preemptive 
nuclear strike, not only will the contrast become clear between 
the conflicts of that time and those of today. It will also become 
evident that the fundamentals of the Cold War threat and the 
reaction to it continue to live on today, even if the threats have 
changed or have largely been resolved. The historical place of 
Baran’s text is characterized by the fact that, ever since his time, 
the transmission of communication, whether through postal or 
networked processes, has no longer been able to function in a 
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has never been possible without control—“Control has existed 
from the beginning” (Galloway 2004, 142)—Baran’s text 
represents an effort to control the distribution of information, 
a type of control that arose after the Second World War, was 
prompted by the computer, and was later on facilitated by Baran 
himself. It is impossible to understand our present circumstances 
without taking this form of control into consideration.
The Nodal Points of Decision-Making
The threat posed by the Cold War, which can be felt in every line 
of Baran’s text, altered the definition of what communication 
means: It was no longer a matter of sending a message as quickly 
as possible from point A to point B. For the longest time, this had 
been the primary goal of many communication techniques (see 
Beniger 1986); within the framework of studying transmission 
delays, it also inspired the development of telegraphy and the 
physics behind it. The ideal type of this sort of communication 
creates direct connections between places, even though the 
technical architecture and economic benefits of networks had 
been known to be more advantageous than this approach since 
the time of optical telegraphy, which was established in France 
toward the end of the eighteenth century. The network approach 
to communication connects places through intermediate 
stations, relays, or nodes (see Siegert 1999). The network con­
structed by Claude Chappe on behalf of Napoleon was admittedly 
focused on Paris, but it covered as many transmitting stations as 
it could throughout the country. It was typical for the historical 
networks of optical and (later) electromagnetic telegraphy to 
be characterized by a central node at which multiple lines ran 
together and were distributed—as quickly as possible, as directly 
as possible, but vulnerable to targeted attacks threatening to dis­
able the entire network in a single strike.
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only be achieved as something distinct from the goal of rapid 
communication. The network for secure transmission would 
thus have to be stabilized as “a new common­user system” 
(1964d, 5), one in which the number of nodes would be optimally 
coordinated with the number of connections. This would require, 
first of all, the use of a digital coding process that is protected 
against attacks by redundancy and can be automated; second, 
it would require the design of a communications infrastructure 
that has more lines or channels than are needed for normal 
operations. A network of this sort does not need to establish a 
direct connection between every node but rather relies on the 
stability of temporary connections. In the middle of the twentieth 
century, networking no longer implied the need of having to 
connect every destination with every other. According to Baran’s 
calculation, a network of this sort could be made stable with 
a connectivity consisting of just three connections departing 
from every node. As a consequence it became more important 
to invest in distribution than in speed. In this regard, as Baran 
stressed, the factor of speed could be replaced by the factor of 
lower costs per message.
In Baran’s model, every digitalized message is divided into stan­
dardized blocks of 1,024 bits and is assigned an identification 
number along with a header containing information about its 
address and sender. As is characteristic of the process of packet 
switching, each of these packets takes different paths and is 
reassembled at the destination on the basis of the information 
in the header. Although these packets were relatively small 
even for the circumstances of the time, their sheer mass played 
a special role. Simply put, Baran’s method of packet switching 
re­determined, at every node, the optimal path that an incoming 
message should take to its destination by means of a continually 
updated timetable with the latest transmission times. Today, 
this process is governed by the protocol known as TCP/IP. In the 
case of every packet, an autonomous decision is made about 
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or overloaded, a sufficient number of other paths will still be 
available. Because the path to be taken is recalculated at every 
node, the packet has to be stored there briefly. The transmission 
is thus constantly interrupted. 
Instead of creating as many direct and presumably fast 
connections as possible—that is, connections that are 
uninterrupted—the interruption itself was reconceived as that 
which ensures a network’s security (in the sense of being inde­
structible): At every node, a packet can take a different path, 
one that is determined on an individual basis depending on the 
capacity of the network. Through the decisions that are made at 
such moments, the interruption of communication has become a 
precondition of its stability. To achieve this operational stability, 
every node must be able to survey the condition of the network 
and its fluctuating transmission times.
Baran’s design implies that messages in postal, telegraphic, 
telephonic, or digital networks should not be sent directly from 
A to B but should rather be distributed in small stages between 
nodes, where they are to be stored temporarily. At the node, it is 
necessary to have information about the state of the network in 
order for a decision to be made about the subsequent route. To 
this end, the header is read. In addition to information about the 
destination and sender, the header contains a “handover number 
tag” that is updated at every node with information about the 
route that has been taken and about the duration of the trans­
mission, as a measure of the respective condition of the network. 
This information assists in determining the further distribution 
of packets, which in a communications network of this sort would 
typically number in the thousands: 
The handover number is a tag in each message block set to 
zero upon initial transmission of the message block into the 
network. Every time the message block is passed on, the 
handover number is incremented. The handover number tag 
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network or path length. (1964d, 7)
On the one hand, this process serves to protect the 
communications system against attacks. On the other hand, 
however, it also serves to increase its productivity. Instead of 
sending information through a single channel, which could be 
either over­ or underburdened, the overall load of the network 
can be evenly distributed by means of switching, which involves 
either storing a data packet a given node or sending it to an 
alternative node. Following the principle of what Peter Galison 
has called “constant vigilance against the re­creation of new 
centers” (2001, 20), today’s technical variations of this process are 
nearly all based on decentralized communications infrastructures 
and protocols. The difference compared to Baran’s model is that 
their architecture allows them to be scale­free (see Galloway 
2004).
The act of interruption allows decisions to be made about the 
subsequent route of a packet. It is of time­critical importance. 
In the case of a telegraphic transmission, individual signals 
are sent in chronological order, and while they are admittedly 
not sent as a bit stream, they are nevertheless transmitted 
discretely. Accordingly, no message is present anywhere in the 
network in the form in which it was sent and in which it will be 
received after it has been reassembled. If a packet goes missing, 
it is reordered.36 If a certain channel is occupied, the next 
shortest is chosen. What was novel about Baran’s design was its 
combination of digitization, packets, and variable paths, which 
enabled a message to be fragmented into strictly delineated 
components that are redundant, that can each take its own path, 
36 This process was later supplemented with so­called “time to live” (TTL). 
Because there is no predetermined path through the network, packets 
can occasionally take a long time hopping around between nodes. In order 
to reduce such wastes of time, the number of intermediate “hops” was 
limited. If a packet reaches its allotted number of hops before arriving at its 
destination, it is deleted (see Galloway 2004, 44).
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process was its introduction of constant interruptions. Although 
conceived as a technical solution at the time, these interruptions 
are now ostensibly being exploited in quite a new way.
The Immediacy of the Flow and the 
Interruption of Bursts 
“On Distributed Communications Networks” subliminally evokes 
an instantaneity of transmission and an ideality of switching, 
both of which go hand in hand with their technical unfeasibility. 
It is in light of these notions that the role of micro­decisions 
emerges in Baran’s model. It provides the toolkit for describing 
communication in terms of constant temporal interruptions, 
during which decisions are made about the further transmis­
sion of packets, and it situates the very stability of the network 
in these interruptions. In doing so, however, the model con­
tradictorily relies on images that suggest presence and the 
continuity of transmission, both of which serve to conceal the 
necessity of decision­making. 
My reading is aimed at the articulations of a particular 
tension—one that often comes to mind when thinking about 
communication or media—according to which communication or 
media erase the separation, overcome the delay, or negate the 
difference that they are predicated upon (see Peters 2000; Chang 
1996). If the purpose of communication is to bring together that 
which is apart, it can, by achieving this, create the appearance 
of having eliminated the separation in question. The starting 
point of my reflections is that a medium of communication 
cannot or can only phantasmatically be immediate. Otherwise, 
it would bring the elements of the relation, between which it is 
37 The noise of analog signals, which were used in the telephone transmissions 
of the time, become louder and louder with every node, which is why this 
method was then unsuitable for such an application.
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communication is taking place, into an unmediated relationship 
that would cause their separation and its mediation to dis­
appear (see Sprenger 2012). As Michel Serres has stated, “A third 
exists before the second. A third exists before the others. . . . I 
have to go through the middle before reaching the end. There 
is always a mediate, a middle, and intermediary” (1992, 53). 
Media are admittedly the condition that enables two elements 
to be connected immediately with one another, for immediacy 
presupposes a relation between two or more elements. There 
is consequently no immediacy without media. Historically, the 
emphasis on the meaning of media is thus permeated by the 
dream of media­less immediacy.
This tension, which is observable in many manifestations 
throughout history, acquires particular significance through 
the fact that Baran’s application is that of a network in which a 
decision has to be made about every distribution process, even 
those taking place between the shortest stages of transmission. 
In the final part of his treatise, Baran summarizes the goal of his 
project as follows: “An ideal electrical communications system 
can be defined as one that permits any person or machine to reli­
ably and instantaneously communicate with any combination of 
other people or machines, anywhere, anytime, and at zero cost” 
(Baran 1964b, 1). Baran openly states that this illusionary goal is 
impossible to achieve. Actual communications systems, he notes, 
are always a compromise; they are never instantaneous and 
they cannot connect all communication partners simultaneously. 
As I hope to demonstrate, Baran excludes and includes this 
instantaneity at the same time. The danger in this is that the 
politics inscribed in the model threaten to become diffuse, even 
though they obey strictly defined rules.38
38 Matthew G. Kirschenbaum (2008) has observed the ideological feature 
of certain media theories to describe digital media as immaterial and 
ephemeral, whereas a close analysis of the material infrastructures of their 
objects reveals the opposite. 
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is defined by a constant, uninterrupted stream of transmis­
sion. In order to make the network appear stable, it should not 
capture the user’s attention that decisions are constantly being 
made (and that they would later be a means of exerting power). 
The idea of “time­space­compression,” which had a continued 
effect in discussions of “information superhighway” during the 
1990s and is conjured up today as “real­time” transmission or 
connection, can also be found in the theoretical principles of 
Baran’s design for a digital network. As mentioned above, such 
transmissions, which pass through a network and are never 
direct, can be described as “bursts of information” (Abbate 2000, 
19)—as irregular collections of data packets that are characterized 
by phases of idleness and delay—and yet in the same stride he 
also evokes the image of regulated, omnipresent, uninterrupted, 
and continuous flow.39
Baran’s text involves both of these metaphors with all of their 
implications and thus contributes to the tension outlined above. 
After all, that which flows cannot also burst, for to do so would be 
to interrupt the continuity of the river.40 In a stream, continuous 
flowing can imply immediacy because, first, every flowing ele­
ment follows uniformly and, second, this concatenated nature 
means that motion at one end of the river creates motion at the 
other. The image of the flow or of the “bit­stream” (Baran 1964a, 
2) relies on the evidence that it takes place between A and B and 
everything sent flows the same path, while actually a network 
does not flow.41 The network structure of today’s communication 
channels and of their information streams is often understood 
39 For a discussion of the “metaphysics of flux” and the “ontologies of flow,” see 
Sutherland (2012).
40 On the metaphorical uses of the river throughout history, see the post­
humously published study by Hans Blumenberg (2012).
41 On this matter it is also worth consulting another foundational text from 
the 1960s, namely Leonard Kleinrock’s Communication Nets (1964), in which 
“flow” is modeled instead of “bursts” and a distinction is drawn between 
steady and unsteady flow.
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or between two communication partners, even though there 
cannot be any direct connections on digital networks. The 
metaphor of the flow conceals the fact that, technically, what is 
taking place is quite the opposite. There is no stream in digital 
networks. That the metaphor suggests as much indicates that 
in this case—and in all of the metaphors associated with the 
Internet—the question of transmission and its technical details 
is not yet properly reflected. The economy of transmission, in 
which something can be in two places simultaneously, lends itself 
quite well to describing communication, which is supposed to be 
uninterrupted and frictionless. This was one of Baran’s goals, but 
the technical means with which he achieved it happened to be the 
opposite of that which is implied by the metaphor of flowing. 
In 1866, Werner von Siemens used a strikingly similar image in the 
context of describing electrical transmissions and the problem of 
their delay: 
This process can approximately be imagined as one in 
which a long, thin tube with elastic walls is pumped with 
air. Near the pump, the tube would be expanded by the 
elastic pressure of the incoming air every time the pump is 
deployed. This expansion would gradually decrease as the air 
reaches the open end of the tube, and the exit of the air from 
this end would only begin at full strength when the tube 
has taken on a conical shape. After the pump has been fully 
deployed, the tube would regain its normal diameter and the 
excess air would exit out of its far end. If the pump is pressed 
again before this emission is complete, the air would not 
appear at the far end intermittently; rather, the stream of air 
would no longer cease and it would flow constantly, though 
at varying speeds. (Siemens 1866, 37–38)
Whereas Siemens, in the last sentence quoted, implied a tran­
sition from bursts to flowing in the sense of oscillations and 
frequencies, which require time to begin, Baran would describe 
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discuss this in greater detail below). The “bursts of information” 
that arrive in a distributed network at arbitrary nodes are 
separate from one another. In their case, an absolute or constant 
speed is unthinkable, however much this might be implied by the 
metaphor of instantaneous flowing.
In pointing all of this out, it has not been my intention to dig up 
some sort of “repressed level” in Baran’s work, to criticize his 
errors, or to claim that the dream of secure communications 
networks will remain a dream. The very fact that both metaphors 
are able to exist side by side is significant to the argumentation 
of this chapter. If Baran’s text is read with an eye for such 
contradictory coherences, a number of unexpressed presup­
positions come to light that ultimately culminate in the question 
of the instantaneity of transmission. Once the observation is 
made that Baran’s design (even as a piece of pre­applicable 
theory) represents a historical shift in our understanding of 
communication, it gains even more significance in light of the 
historical issue of immediate and simultaneous transmission. 
Since the earliest experiments with electricity and telegraphy, 
this issue has influenced efforts to overcome distance for the 
sake of communication, and it persists today in sociological 
theories concerned with the consequences of such technical 
networks. Before further elucidating and contextualizing Baran’s 
argumentation, I should perhaps first make a few remarks to 
illustrate the genealogy of the phantasm known as “real­time.”
Electricity and Instantaneity 
On a warm summer day in 1729, the dyer and physicist Stephen 
Gray suspended a brass wire on the property of his friend 
Granville Wheler’s estate in Kent. When one end of the wire was 
touched with a rubbed tube of glass, small pieces of leaf brass 
began to dance like butterflies on the other end and settle on the 
wire (Figure 4). And thus from one end of the yard, without being 
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friend’s voice at the other end, Gray became convinced that he 
had generated an “Electrick Vertue”—attraction, electric power. 
Gray referred to the wires as “Lines of Communication” (1731, 
27). In order for electricity to be able to communicate in Gray’s 
sense, three elements are necessary: two entities attempting 
to communicate (one on each end), and whatever there might 
be between them. The sender and the receiver have to be apart 
from one another, for otherwise there would neither be a channel 
nor a connection. Communication requires distance; it requires 
a chasm, and connection requires separation. Not only does 
electricity surmount such distance; it also seems to do away with 
it altogether. It transmits by making the difference of time imper­
ceptible and by dispelling space, by rendering both time and 
space immeasurable even though there is a piece of wire hanging 
through them. 
[Figure 4] Communication through Wires (Source: Doppelmayr 1744; Table 1)
Gray could not say whether electricity had a certain speed. As it 
seemed, it needed no mediation and no code; it was rather simply 
there, instantaneously and without any “perceivable difference” 
(Gray 1731, 28)—at both sides of the channel simultaneously. 
That which occurred at Gray’s and Wheler’s ends of the wire 
seemed to take place at the same time. An entire back yard can 
lie in between and soon an entire world, strewn with copper 
wire but requiring not a single minute, second, moment, or blink 
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caused by the sluggishness of our senses and the imprecision 
of measuring instruments, became extremely productive. With 
the advent of telegraphy it entered a broader discourse. At one 
point it was conceptualized as an “electric union” (van Rens­
selaer 1858, 5), even though it had long been obvious, in physical 
and technical terms, that every transmission requires time and 
that instantaneity cannot exist. Since the discovery of electrical 
conductivity in the 1730s, since the development of electro­
magnetic telegraphy in the 1830s, and since the subsequent 
implementation of a global electromagnetic communications 
network, electricity has been conceived to be instantaneous, 
its communication to be non­temporal, and its effects to be 
simultaneous.
The phantasmatic nature of this immediacy depends on the 
directness of its connections, which bring together two places, 
two devices, or two people but require no time to do so and 
are thus thought to abolish space. Although physics, then and 
now, has known this to be impossible, the idea is nevertheless 
maintained, in the sense of “coherence in contradiction,” in 
the very contexts in which such impossibility happens to be 
obvious. Even the British physicist Charles Wheatstone, who 
had conducted the first successful experiments to measure 
the speed of electricity, attributed to it an instantaneity that 
negated the speed that he was attempting to investigate (see 
Wheatstone 1834). For in the end, an instantaneous transmis­
sion is at two places simultaneously; it is without time, space, 
or media—it is immediate. There is more to this than simply the 
idea of unattainable instantaneity. The question bores deeply 
into the foundations of physics and is concerned with issues on 
its philosophical fringes such as causality, actio in distans, the 
ether, and ultimately the cohesion of the universe (see Hesse 
1961). It has been discussed since antiquity, and even though it 
is not addressed directly in Baran’s work, the profundity of the 
problem remains. The questions concerning the time­critical 
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Baran’s studies, are not entirely absorbed by their technical and 
physical aspects. The tension between the metaphors of bursting 
and flowing derives from this history. Despite their differences, 
it draws a link between the early study of electricity and packet 
switching.
However often network theories tend to be influenced by such 
phantasms, they have featured just as prominently in sociological 
studies. In an extensive analysis of the synchronization practices 
of social time and flows, for instance, Manuel Castells has dis­
cussed networks and global interdependence in terms of the 
“annihilation of space and time by electronic means” (1998, 379). 
Castells describes real­time interaction as something that pro­
vides a venue for social connections—as something that allows 
locations to be shared simultaneously and actors to operate in 
the same space—even though there is in fact distance between 
them. On this basis, he asserts that the network society is 
“without reference to either past or future” (1998, 386). In the 
final pages of his book, Castells thus contradicts the pains­
takingly detailed argument that he had been making all along; 
just as he disregards the contingencies of globalization, at this 
point he also overlooks the effects of the convergence of tech­
nologies and social practices. In this regard, Castells’s remarks 
are genealogically continuous with the popular discourses that, 
in line with the technical knowledge of the mid­nineteenth 
century, had established telegraphy as the instantaneous 
medium of a “world organism” (Kapp 1877, 100) and would recur 
in Marshall McLuhan’s notion of “electric nowness” (McLuhan 
and Nevitt 1973, 2). The metaphor of the flow, the image of 
uninterruptedness, and instantaneous immediacy are common 
currency. As has already been indicated, they obscure the fact 
that a time and a place for interruptions are needed in order for 
decisions to be made.
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The aim of the process outlined above is to balance out the 
load throughout the network. Its result is the elimination of 
instantaneity (De-Instantanisierung). When speed is no longer the 
primary goal, the idea of instantaneous transmission loses some 
of its appeal and is no longer favored as a technical solution. The 
fact that in Baran’s text instantaneity nevertheless resurfaces 
as a discursive effect lies in the sort of economy that informs his 
idea of “perfect switching.” This ideal form of communication is 
related to the information that the network possesses about its 
own condition as well as to the speed at which this information 
is transmitted.42 Perfect switching thus makes it clear how the 
phantasm of instantaneity intervenes in the politics of networks.
Baran described the advantages of his process by drawing an 
analogy to a postman sorting the mail in the middle of the United 
States. In a “store­and­forward system,” which he also refers 
to as “message switching” and in which entire messages are 
forwarded at every station, the postman will receive messages 
“simultaneously” from San Francisco, even though they had been 
sent at different times (Baran 1964d, 7). By comparing the transit 
times recorded on their postage stamps, he can then determine, 
assuming that the channel of communication is bidirectional, the 
best route for the letters or packages at his office that need to 
be sent in the opposite direction (that is, to San Francisco): “Each 
42 In this sense, the distributed network is comparable to the “ordinary whale” 
that Hermann von Helmholtz mentions while describing the synchronization 
problems associated with the slow speed of nervous systems: “Happily the 
distances are short which have to be traversed by our sensuous perceptions 
before they reach the brain, otherwise our self­consciousness would lag far 
behind the present, and even behind the perceptions of sound . . . With an 
ordinary whale the case is perhaps more dubious; for in all probability the 
animal does not feel a wound near its tail until a second after it has been 
inflicted, and requires another second to send the command to the tail to 
defend itself” (1853, 325). 
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path” (Baran 1964d, 7). 
[Figure 5] Handover Number Table (Source: Baran 1964d, 7)
What is decisive in this is that the postman can extract 
information about the best route simply by looking at the 
stamped date of dispatch, which accompanies each piece of mail 
just as a handover number tag is meant to accompany every 
data packet (Figure 5). The message carries information about its 
own transmission, whether on its stamp or in its header. In their 
sheer number, the values on these “tags” indicate the amount 
of time needed to traverse from node to node up the point in 
question and thus provide information about the current state of 
the network and its workload. This information is tabulated and 
made available to be reviewed at every node. Thus it is possible 
to determine for each packet the optimal channel that it ought 
to take next—a channel into a future that has been extrapolated 
from data provided by the past. Initially, all of the entries on 
Baran’s “handover number table” are given a high value, which 
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The system is able to learn, adapt itself, and constantly update 
its own status without the need for a center where all of this 
information is gathered. Because distributed networks lack such 
a center, every node has its own image of the overall network, 
that is, its own table. But what is the temporal component of this 
image?
Executed at every node (including those of centralized networks), 
switching is the process of transferring a message from one 
channel to another in order to bring it closer to its destination 
with the help of the information in the table. According to Baran, 
traditional switching does not create possibilities for redundancy 
because it provides only one route instead of multiple to choose 
from. Starting from a central node allows for few possible ways 
of reaching a destination. In a network based on Baran’s model, 
a direct consequence of this process is the demand for increased 
computing and memory capacity at the nodes, a demand 
that happened to be met by steady improvements in micro­
computing. In 1969, a comparable network with seven nodes was 
constructed in the western United States, namely ARPANET, from 
which the Internet would originate.43 
Perfect switching, for which Baran had high hopes, designates 
a routing process that is “able to find ‘best’ surviving paths in 
a heavily damaged network” (Baran 1964c, 1). In undamaged 
networks, perfect switching is the ideal selection of routes. It is 
thus closely associated with the assumption of instantaneous 
transmission and real­time: “[T]he shortest instantaneously 
available path through the network should be found with 
the expectation that the status of the network will be rapidly 
changing” (Baran 1964d, 6). Its precise goal is to avoid direct 
connections in favor of there being multiple routes, out of which 
43 In his book Die Verbundenheit der Dinge (“The Connectedness of Things”), 
Sebastian Gießmann traces the origin of ARPANET back to Baran’s network 
ideas (2014, 355–56).
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of the traffic that is burdening the surrounding nodes: “Per­
fect switching provides an upper bound of expected system 
performance for a gridded network; the diversity of assignment 
case provides a lower bound” (Baran 1964d, 4). However, for per­
fect switching to work (and this applies to “imperfect switching” 
as well), each node must possess information about the status of 
the network. 
Synchronization processes are therefore necessary to make 
information available to each node about its specific status 
within the network. By equipping packets with information 
about their transmission times and using this information to 
update his network, however, Baran was faced with the fun­
damental physical problems of relativity and synchronization 
(see Galison 2003): The transmission of this information, which 
is supposed to be used simultaneously to ascertain the present 
state of the nodes, itself requires time. As Sebastian Gieß­
mann has shown (2009, 245), the “disparate time regime” of this 
transmission is time­critical to the extent that the status of the 
network and the workload of the nodes change along with the 
economizing optimizations that take place during the transmis­
sion itself. Every packet carries a piece of this information, and 
as a mass they provide the node with the data necessary to form 
a serviceable map. However, because the information about 
transmission times is obsolete at the moment that it arrives at a 
given node (because the transmission of this information about 
transmission times itself requires time), it can only ever provide 
an image of the past. In the time needed for a packet to move 
from one node to another, which might have seemed to be the 
optimal next step at the moment the packet was sent, the node 
in question could already be occupied with other packets. In all 
of its perfection, perfect switching requires exact information 
about the present state of affairs; such real­time information, 
however, is in fact technically impossible to attain. This relativistic 
shift, which undermines any requirement for real­time data, is 
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instantaneous and distant effects cannot be achieved imme­
diately. Real­time can only mean that signals are arriving at the 
speed in which they can be processed as quickly as possible: in 
time rather than real­time. Real­time always takes place between 
two points in time and is therefore not instantaneous. At this 
point, again, the tension comes into play that is inherent to 
communication in its electrical or electronic implementation.
The network has neither knowledge nor control of its present 
condition but rather only of those past conditions from which 
an optimal distribution of packets was extrapolated for the 
future. The process of synchronization reduces time­critically 
differing temporalities to a single denominator without ever 
being able to achieve real­time or simultaneity. Synchronization 
is the coordination of multiple levels of time; it is an attempt 
to harmonize various technical orders in an effort to operate 
with differences.44 Its goal is not (and cannot be) to achieve 
concurrence but rather to determine the limits between which 
the desired event can take place, and in this case the desired 
event is successful transmission. Two processes or events are 
therefore synchronous if they do not exceed the interval of time 
that is required for a technical process to run. In other words, 
every act of synchronization contains a remnant of time­bound 
transmission that cannot be simultaneous; at best, it can be 
timely enough that the delay does not affect the technical 
44 One of Baran’s footnotes, which concerns the importance of the “velocity 
of propagation over long links,” is thus especially telling in this regard: 
“3000 miles at ≈ 150,000 miles/sec ≈ 50 msec transmission time, T. 1024­bit 
message at 1,500,000 bits/sec ≈ 2/3 msec message time, M. Therefore, T 
>> M” (1964d, 6). In these formulas, the entire model is defined as a syn­
chronization process, and this is because communication can only succeed 
if the time of transmission and that of processing are coordinated with 
one another. The standardization of data into quickly processable blocks 
of information should thus be understood as a response to the problem of 
synchronization.
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the information about the workload of the nodes only has to be 
timely enough to enable the decision for an alternative route. As 
such, synchronization is not the production of real­time (Echtzeit) 
but rather of timeliness (Rechtzeitigkeit), and this is because it is 
dependent on limits (on the notion of “timeliness,” see Rohr­
huber 2009 and Pias 2009). This timeliness, with which imperfect 
switching can operate smoothly, is achieved by complying with 
certain limits; it is not the sort of metaphysical exactness implied 
by the term “simultaneity.” Baran referred to his process as “hot­
potato routing” because the packets were to be passed along as 
quickly as possible from node to node like hot potatoes (so as to 
avoid congestion and burnt hands): “Each message is regarded 
as a ‘hot potato,’ and rather than hold the hot potato, the node 
tosses the message to its neighbor who will now try to get rid of 
the message” (Baran 1964d, 7). To stick with this metaphor, syn­
chronization operates with the time that occurs between catching 
a hot potato and the onset of pain. 
If the perfect path were instantaneously available, the 
information at the respective node would have to be perfectly up 
to date, which it can never be. The table would have to indicate 
the condition of all the nodes simultaneously in order for per­
fect switching to be guaranteed, which would in turn mean that 
the information would be everywhere at the same time. A flow 
or an uninterrupted stream of information would be necessary 
where there happens only to be bursts. Perfect switching 
implies the instantaneity of switching, which presupposes the 
instantaneous transmission of necessary information. In such a 
case, the network would be present to itself. This cascade would 
end in a self­presence that is characteristic of the medium of 
voice, which for the speaker is no longer a medium because it 
does not have to be transmitted to him or her: “Everything had 
45 TCP/IP accounts for such delays in advance by having a built­in tolerance for 
runtime errors and deviations. Difference is thus inherent to the protocol.
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as voice is intolerant to delay” (Baran 2002, 5). There is no room 
for interruption in the self­presence of voice (see Derrida 2011). 
Yet interruptions are there. The network, which is stabilized by 
interruptions, should collapse.
The Disconnection of Connection
As we experience whenever we are online, however, the network 
has not collapsed. Despite the delays in question, it continues to 
operate. Thus, immediacy and interruption are not significant at 
the level of daily experience. Baran drew attention to the fact that 
the form of transmission designed by him can appear to be direct 
and electrically instantaneous even though it requires interme­
diate steps: 
The network user who has called up a “virtual connection” 
to an end station and has transmitted messages across 
the United States in a fraction of a second might also view 
the system as a black box providing an apparent circuit 
connection across the country.  (1964d, 6) 
As Baran noted, a circuit connection takes place in “real­time” 
because there are no nodes but rather a direct connection 
between A and B. The transmission appears to occur in “real­
time” because electricity is presumed to be instantaneous and 
there are no nodes to break the connection. To a user who is 
receiving data, listening to a voice on the telephone, or even 
responding to this voice, transmissions sent by means of packet 
switching may appear to be occurring in “quasi­real­time” (Baran 
1964d, 6), as though they have been produced with the circuit 
switching used to make telegraphic direct connections. For the 
user it can seem as though there is no pause, delay, or separation 
and as though he or she is interacting in a conversation or 
surfing on a website in a Platonistically present manner. Although 
the user’s communication partner is in a distant location, the 
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leaves the impression that this distance does not exist. 
Baran’s epistemological reflections on this connection concern 
the precarious status of media, which, from a theoretical per­
spective, can be made “readable, audible, visible, and perceptible, 
all the while exhibiting the tendency to extinguish themselves 
and their constitutive participation in these sensualities and thus, 
as it were, to become imperceptible, anaesthetic” (Engell and Vogl 
1999, 10). With all the openness expected of an engineer, Baran 
summarized the disconnection of the user through the invisibility 
of the medium as follows: 
This choice meant that there would be no physical real­time 
connection between the transmitting and receiving end. But, 
I felt that would be OK if the transmission data rate was high 
enough, the user would be fooled by the illusion that a real­
time connection existed. (Baran 2002, 4)
Baran’s idea is in tune with a thought expressed by Marshall 
McLuhan, namely that media are invisible to their users: “Indeed, 
it is only too typical that the ‘content’ of any medium blinds us 
to the character of the medium” (McLuhan 1964, 9). This thesis 
about the disappearance of media, which has become well 
established in media studies (see Mersch 2004 and Jäger 2004) 
and has been referred to as “aesthetic neutrality” (Krämer 2003, 
81), is expressed by Baran within the framework of a technically 
conceived model. The illusion of the user is the flipside of the 
technical knowledge of the engineer. Illusion is flow, transmission 
is burst—and both are entwined on the imaginary level of the 
text. 
Pragmatically—and as far as everyday life is concerned—this 
illusion may be inconsequential. Whoever is communicating over 
a network is not meant to be aware of the fact a series of imper­
ceptible decisions is being made about the data packets that con­
stitute his or her communication. This has no implication for our 
phenomenological perspective, for our social interactions, and 
for any theory of communication that is only concerned with the 
success of communication: 
On the contrary, the other person whom I am able to call is 
“present” to me in an emphatic and immediately relevant 
way. He is “simultaneous” with me but not in the sense that 
he is doing this or that at the same time as I am doing such 
things. Rather, he is “simultaneous” with me to the extent 
that the meaningfulness of his activity can be expressed to 
me at any given time—and vice versa. (Konitzer 2005, 196)
Even if disruptions and interruptions might hinder our ability to 
understand someone on the telephone or to reload a website, we 
are still able to relate to one another in a convincing manner. For 
successful communication, it is sufficient to know that the other is 
quasi­present. 
In this regard, that which happens to play no role in daily life is in 
fact all the more relevant both politically and in terms of media 
theory. The place of transmission evoked by Baran—along with 
its delays, its difference, and the interruptions during which 
decisions are made—are issues of immediate concern to the 
“fooled” user: To be able to interrupt communication is to possess 
power. To be able to do this without being observed, moreover, 
is to exert an invisible sort of power. Such power will threaten to 
become unassailable if transmissions are presumed to be truly 
instantaneous. The illusion of connection cited by Baran will 
inhibit the very network politics of interruption that his model 
introduced, as will any media theory that claims transmissions to 
be instantaneous.46 By following such paths, we will neither be 
able to confront the challenge of government­sponsored surveil­
lance nor that of net neutrality, even though Baran’s text is part 
of their origin.
46 See, for instance, McLuhan and Nevitt (1973) and Virilio (2000). For a more 
comprehensive discussion of this issue, see Sprenger (2012).


Conclusion: Toward 
a Network Politics of 
Interruption
The idea of controlling digital networks with decisions, as dem­
onstrated by Baran’s model, was conceived to solve a specific 
technical problem. It emerged at a particular historical moment 
and subsequently served various purposes. Micro­decisions are 
neither inherently good nor inherently bad. For the operations 
of a digital network, however, they are unavoidable. In order to 
maintain the possibility of altering the scope of such decisions, it 
is therefore important to protect them from being appropriated 
and to be aware of the historical situations in which they became 
plausible. If we could succeed in developing a sort of network 
politics that combines this historical perspective with what is 
happening in the present—that is, if network politics were to be 
aware of the history of the Internet’s architecture in relation to 
the current debates about net neutrality and surveillance, then 
perhaps returning to the beginnings would provide us with new 
insight into possible futures. It could come to light that decisions, 
though necessary, do not necessarily have to be made always and 
already in advance of a given transmission; that every transmis­
sion may indeed be an exertion of power, but networks allow for 
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for traffic to exist without control, the traffic always precedes 
the control in question. A network politics of this sort could, in 
response to the deluge of connections that we face on a daily 
basis, fight to preserve a space for disconnections in life and it 
could furthermore do much to draw a firm line between control 
and surveillance.
By way of conclusion, I should therefore take another look at the 
connections and disconnections that result from these decisions. 
Over the course of this essay, I have focused on some of the 
times and places at which the conditions for micro­decisions have 
been created by means of the protocological principle. To these 
occasions could be added the establishment of the X.25 protocol 
for telephone networks, the development of ARPANET and the 
French network known as Cyclades, the many stages of TCP/IP’s 
implementation, and the present development of the so­called 
Internet of things, which makes our environment predictable. 
What is common to these examples is that there are not only 
places and times at which the standards of micro­decisions have 
been institutionally determined; what is more, they themselves 
generate places in the network and obey a temporality of their 
own. Decisions are made at these places in order for things to 
proceed independently within a specific temporality. These 
places and times lend themselves to a media­archaeological per­
spective that, in a strict sense, should not be separated from the 
network­political implications of its findings.
Given the depth of their effects, the modes of operating technical 
networks and their media should be understood above all 
in terms of the way that they make use of synchronization to 
process differences. Transmissions of digital data in distributed 
or scale­free networks—from browsing to high­frequency trading 
and the Internet of things—are so effective precisely because 
they are constantly interrupted (while admittedly operating at 
the highest possible speed). Taking the history of such networks 
into account, one could even assume that they are technically 
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A continuous flow would wash away all differences and thus 
also do away with the separation or disconnection that media 
presuppose and require. The concealment or obscuration of 
interruption, for which evidence can be found in a variety of his­
torical contexts, has technical and theoretical consequences as 
well as political effects. If transmission is conceived in terms of 
overcoming distance, as in Castells’s notion of the “annihilation 
of space and time by electronic means” (1998, 379), then we will 
lose sight, like Baran’s deceived user, of the operational modes of 
digital networks and thus also lose sight of their politics of con­
nection and disconnection. What appears to reach our screens 
as a continuous flow is in fact a series of bursts composed of 
information. Decisions are made about every burst, and these 
decisions have political implications. They determine who can 
be connected and who is disconnected. If data were in fact 
flowing, transmission would be instantaneous; there would be 
no decisions because there would be neither a time nor a place 
for them. They would then always be made in advance and 
could not be changed. In other words: Theories of immediacy 
are instructions on how to be powerless. By obscuring the times 
and places of such decision­making, we would be in danger of 
neglecting the possibility of discussing the processes with which 
technical standards and modes of distribution have been trans­
formed and thus shaped by interrupted streams—the processes 
that determine who is connected with whom and who is discon­
nected from whom.
Baran’s economy of communication is ultimately not aimed at 
avoiding the high costs of unused channels or nodes caused by 
pauses and idle moments between transmissions. The problem 
of overloaded nodes did not exist at the beginning of the 
1960s. In light of the excess capacity at the time, neutrality and 
prioritization were thus not things that would have had to be 
considered. It could therefore hardly have seemed like a political 
act of the highest order to integrate, at the technical level, a sort 
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bility of hardware, applications, and content. Today, however, 
these issues are far more portentous: The use of prioritization 
to manage overloaded networks is no longer simply a technical 
problem; it has also become a social and political problem of 
growing virulence. In turn, it has thereby also become clear 
that the technical solutions of the 1960s, which were discovered 
under different circumstances, are still exerting effects under 
our present conditions. Accordingly, Baran’s model provided the 
framework that gave rise to the present necessity of bandwidth 
management and the corresponding political status of micro­
decisions. Though under different conditions, they have been 
inscribed in the network architecture since 1964 and they have 
been political decisions the entire time. This is so even if, in 1964, 
they were made without discrimination and could therefore 
appear to be democratic until the network became overloaded. 
Before that point, that is, decisions still had to be made but they 
did not prioritize anyone over anyone else. The success of the 
Internet since the 1990s is not only politicized in the trivial sense 
that it serves as forum for expressing opinions, intervening, and 
organizing. Through this success, its infrastructure has rather 
become the global foundation for social connections; sociality 
and technology have thus become so tightly intertwined that it is 
impossible to say which preceded the other. If this infrastructure 
were to change, or even if its functionality were called into ques­
tion, then there would be ineluctable repercussions for the con­
stitution of the social.
These observations have a series of consequences for a net­
work politics of interruption and for the opposition against the 
decisions in question. As it is, the decision­making process cannot 
be denied; to do so would be to deny the very thing about which 
decisions are being made: the transmission of data in digital 
networks. That decisions are being made cannot be treated as 
a matter of negotiation; to do this would be to dismantle the 
foundation of the very object under negotiation. The difficulty 
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decisions enable that which we are fighting for. In this situation, 
it is thus difficult to adopt an unambiguous position. There is 
instead a discursive strategy at our disposal, one that has been 
endorsed by the Chaos Computer Club and the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, that can be deployed to give users a voice in digital 
cultures and offers them some means of self­defense: On the 
one hand, this strategy involves the expansion of social debates 
and the demand for providers to make their procedures trans­
parent; on the other hand, it involves teaching individuals about 
encryption and technical processes in order to oppose the 
enforced transparency with anonymous intransparency.
This pragmatism accepts the technical circumstances in order 
to improve them and to oppose the loss of control that the 
blogger Michael Seemann has described as an effect of digital 
connectivity (see Seemann 2015). On another level, it employs 
the sort of analysis that Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker 
executed in their book The Exploit.47 Its goal is to investigate the 
protocols and standards of networks that regulate what happens 
with delayed data and thus determine who can be connected 
with whom and what can or cannot be said and done.48 Galloway 
47 See Galloway and Thacker (2007). Even in Galloway’s work, however, there 
is mention of instantaneous transmission: “Just as Marx descended into 
the internal structure of the commodity to interpret its material workings 
within the context of production at large, I must descend instead into the 
distributed networks, the programming languages, the computer protocols, 
and other digital technologies that have transformed twenty­first­century 
production into a vital mass of immaterial flows and instantaneous trans­
actions” (Galloway 2004, 20). Here, too, Derrida’s idea of “coherence in con­
tradiction” is evident, in that Galloway demonstrates the opposite of what 
his metaphor implies.
48 Under digital conditions, discourse analysis could be applied—and I under­
stand that this new orientation is obvious by now—not only at the level of 
the archive but also at the level of micro­decisions, protocols, or algorithms. 
Like traditional instruments of power, they likewise determine what can be 
said and seen. Perhaps the next step would be to reformulate the methods 
of discourse analysis and media archaeology at this level in order to keep up 
with technical developments. The goal, in other words, would be to analyze 
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“Yet within protocological networks, political acts generally 
happen not by shifting power from one place to another but by 
exploiting power differentials already existing in the system” 
(Galloway 2004, 81). As hackers understand the word, an “exploit” 
is a vulnerable element in a system that allows the powers at 
play to be used to new ends. In order to take advantage of such 
opportunities and exploit the immanent dynamics of a given 
system—a tactic, as it were, that is indirect and yet responds to 
the moment—it is necessary to have a deep understanding of the 
structure that one wishes to change. Only with a firm command 
of the rules will we be able to undermine them, affirm them, or 
rewrite them to our liking. Such attempts appear helpless in their 
effort to maintain a type of sovereignty that binds control to a 
subject. Who should know who has access to which data? The 
conditions of such sovereignty have changed so radically that it is 
by now high time to reexamine their technological underpinnings. 
No one has control in digital networks, and this is because digital 
networks are themselves nothing if not the decision­bound con­
trol of their distribution. 
A politics of this sort thus ought to begin at the level of micro­
decisions and thus at the places and times of decision­making. 
As interruptions, they are central to understanding the structure 
of networks. They have locations because they are nodes in the 
network that break up direct connections; they are temporal 
because time is what interruptions require—always more 
than one would like, and yet this duration is a precondition for 
the network’s very possibility. Interruptions are what Edward 
Snowden referred to as “one­stop­shops” (Mestmacher­Steiner 
2014): At one step, in a short amount of time, and at a single 
place, they allow for a variety of things to be accomplished. It 
is not necessary to monitor every terminal; a single node will 
what it is that networks, by means of connections and disconnections, have 
allowed or disallowed to be said. 
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these interruptions, delays, and differences. Beyond looking for 
exploits, which Galloway and Thacker have defined as vulner­
abilities within systems of power that are capable of being 
modulated, an alternative network politics should not only make 
interruption its mode of operation but should also understand 
interruption as communication. In every digital network, inter­
ruption is the primary mode of operation. Because of interrup­
tions, transmissions can be made. 
From this point, as I would like to note in closing, alternative 
forms of organization should be sought that no longer aim to 
produce immediate connections but are rather founded on inter­
ruptions, which are inevitable in any case, and on the accidence 
of connections. A collective of this sort would have to understand 
its own disconnections—the interruption of its connections—not 
as a threat to be combated but rather as an advantage over those 
that require connectivity only to lose it upon its interruption. 
Connections are created, but disconnections or separations are 
as well. Interruptions could lead to an organizational mode of 
disorganization. An “organization of the organizationless,” as 
the social theorist Rodrigo Nunes (2014) has promoted, could in 
this sense also be understood as an affirmation of interruption 
that is aware of the fact that decisions are being made about its 
connections, that control is inevitable, but that control can be 
undermined. Parallel to this, new network architectures, such as 
Recursive InterNetwork Architecture (RINA), could introduce new 
possibilities for changing the controversial aspects of today’s net­
works while remaining faithful to their underlying principles (see 
Day 2010).
In other words, the difference between control and surveillance 
in digital networks in the post­Snowden era has become clearer, 
as has the need to control this control and to circumvent 
surveillance. The prerequisite for this course of action is the 
technically codified condition that there can be no central 
authority for making decisions but rather only local applications 
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2004, 82). This architecture allots a precarious status to the 
political in networks: To change the protocol is to meddle with the 
preconditions of its own activity. To control the application of the 
protocol can only be achieved with additional protocols. And to 
disclose micro­decisions as decisions, to write their history, and 
to recognize their places and times may admittedly be to criticize 
them, but this in itself changes nothing. In this way, however, the 
detailed work of network politics, as has been exemplified in the 
public debates over net neutrality, would certainly be placed on a 
firmer foundation.
This essay has analyzed the “cultural techniques of synchro­
nization” (see Kassung and Macho 2012) that ensure the timely 
nature of communication and are thus central to an archaeology 
of real­time and to a genealogy of its phantasms. To the extent 
that they are entwined, they demonstrate that the history of 
media and the history of immediacy are closely associated with 
one another. Moreover, they also demonstrate how deeply the 
micro­decisions of transmission have become embedded in the 
“technological condition” (Hörl 2011) of the present. Herein lies 
the significance of future developments in net neutrality and of 
the political consequences of the NSA revelations. Despite our 
apparent obsession with the present, history lessons are nec­
essary to ensure that we will continue to have a voice in digital 
cultures.  
In short, the question is whether we want to live in a world that 
appears to flow because every decision has already been made—
in an opaque manner, given that we will not have any access to 
the background where constant interruptions and decisions are 
indeed taking place—or whether we want to live in a world that 
will never be present to itself and in which, though there will be 
no immediacy, every decision at every node can be altered and 
remain open to new possibilities. We cannot avoid this ques­
tion because we are already caught in its net (so to speak). We 
can, however, use the power of interruption to our own ends. 
113The potential emergency of their being a continuous, uninter­
rupted period of decision­making can be diverted if decisions 
could continue to be identified, despite their massive number, on 
an individual basis. This could remain possible so long as their 
times and places are known. If decision­making were to become 
normal, if it were to become simply a condition of everyday life, 
then, as Giorgio Agamben has suggested (2014), the idea of crisis, 
which has always designated a moment of decision­making, 
would lose its temporal index and become a common state of 
affairs. It would be frictionless and devoid of interruption. In this 
sense, digital cultures can be cultures of crises (see Chun 2011).
Perhaps, however, an even greater challenge is looming in a 
different place altogether: Micro­decisions are made by machines 
both for and about other machines. Although we might still be 
able to identify individual decisions, we will always be too late to 
the scene, because their sheer number and speed exceeds our 
capacities. If machines communicate only with machines and 
people are mere accessories at the ends of the nodes, if the inter­
ests of power continue to be served by newer and more precise 
machines, and if decisions no longer have decision­makers, then 
the actual task before us will have shifted. It could then be the 
case that our traditional description languages, our concepts of 
humans and machines, of creation, work, and activity will have 
become too imprecise to comprehend what is happening and 
who is supervising whom. Perhaps they are no longer sufficient 
for understanding machines that neither render human beings 
superfluous nor were designed according to our model. Con­
fronted with the question of what control and surveillance might 
mean in this situation, I would like to bring my essay to a close.
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Be it in the case of opening a website, sending an email, or 
high-frequency trading, bits and bytes of information have 
to cross numerous nodes at which micro-decisions are made. 
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less than the future of the Internet as we know it.
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